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ARTICLES
Attorneys, Document Discovery, and Discipline
PAULA SCHAEFER*
“[A]n attorney’s ethical duty to advance the interests of his client is limited by
an equally solemn duty to comply with the law and the standards of
professional conduct.”1

ABSTRACT
Most attorneys who engage in document discovery misconduct in civil cases in
federal court do not face professional discipline. This is the case even though
professional conduct rules prohibit every aspect of discovery abuse, from failure
to produce requested documents to spoliation of evidence. Further, most federal
courts have their own disciplinary systems, and judges and lawyers alike have an
ethical obligation to report attorney misconduct. Though the tools are in place,
the discipline system is not being used to address pervasive document discovery
misconduct.
This Article argues that federal courts could make more effective use of
attorney discipline systems to improve document discovery in civil cases. In
making the case for reform, this Article explains the appropriate cases for
discipline referrals, how behavioral legal ethics research should influence judges
to consistently turn to the discipline system, and the advantages of discipline over
sanctions alone. The Article concludes by considering three different settings in
which document discovery discipline reform could be achieved: at the judgelevel, court-level, and nationally. This discussion considers ways to implement
change in each setting and the reasons some avenues may be more effective than
others.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. Thanks to Clifford Shirley, Alex
Long, Cassandra Burke Robertson, and Ben Barton for providing helpful suggestions on prior drafts of this
Article. Thanks also to participants in workshops at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools Annual
Conference and the University of Tennessee College of Law for their feedback on the Article. Finally, thank you
to Christopher John and Andrew Tucker for excellent research assistance. © 2017, Paula Schaefer.
1. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 600 (2010) (quoting Nix v.
Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168 (1986)).
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3.
C.

INTRODUCTION
Attorney misconduct in document discovery2 in federal court is pervasive.3
Misconduct in this context includes violations of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP), court orders governing discovery, and the common law duty
of preservation.4 The problem permeates civil litigation to such a degree that it is
difficult to quantify with precision. Disputes about whether an opponent has met
its discovery obligations are so ubiquitous that a search for the phrase “discovery
dispute” in a federal district court database for a twelve-month period yields over

2. “Document discovery” refers to discovery of both electronic and paper documents.
3. See Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789
(2010). See generally infra Part I. Though Part I does not attempt to quantify the problem, it cites numerous
cases in which attorneys have violated procedural rules, court orders, and common law duties. It also looks at
the rising number of sanctions used to address discovery misconduct, which has been quantified recently.
4. Infra Part I.
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fourteen hundred cases.5 Federal judges are understandably frustrated by
attorneys’ failure to comply with the law and with their constant need for court
intervention.6 U.S. Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm once lamented, “[C]ounsel
for both Plaintiff and Defendant have exhibited a disturbing lack of knowledge
of, or disregard for, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . . The discovery
violations by both attorneys are numerous and vividly demonstrate how
discovery should not be practiced.”7
A representative example of attorney document discovery misconduct is
provided by the case 1100 West, LLC v. Red Spot Paint & Varnish Co.8 Attorneys
practicing in the law firm Bose McKinney & Evans, LLC (BME) represented
Red Spot in litigation (filed in 2005) in which the key issue was whether the
chemicals TCE and PCE, which may present health risks at certain levels of
exposure, had been used on Red Spot property.9 On the eve of trial in 2008, the
plaintiff, 1100 West, made a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to obtain certified copies of documents.10 The EPA file contained documents Red Spot had not previously
produced in discovery (even though they were responsive to requests for
production), including documents reflecting the presence of TCE on Red Spot
property.11 1100 West filed a motion for an emergency hearing on October 14,
2008.12 Thereafter, BME attorneys produced the EPA documents, characterizing
the delayed production as an unintentional oversight.13
After 1100 West filed a motion for sanctions on October 27, 2008, and sought
additional discovery regarding the alleged discovery misconduct, the court

5. Admittedly, the search is over-inclusive (the existence of a discovery dispute does not always indicate
misconduct in document discovery), and under-inclusive (not every violation of a discovery obligation is
brought to a court’s attention or characterized as a “discovery dispute”). Nonetheless, this search provides a
sense of how often federal district courts address allegations of discovery conduct that violates legal obligations.
See also infra note 162.
6. See, e.g., Marti v. Baires, No. 1:08–cv–00653–AWI–SKO PC, 2012 WL 2029720, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 5,
2012) (“[T]he Court is now embroiled in the minutiae of the parties’ discovery disputes . . . .”); Atlas Res., Inc.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F.R.D. 482, 492 (D.N.M. 2011) (describing counsel’s “cavalier, often disdainful,
attitude” toward discovery); Adelman v. Boy Scouts of Am., 276 F.R.D. 681, 684 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (describing
attorney objections that were not “even remotely supported by the law governing discovery” and the
“mini-litigation” necessitated by those objections).
7. Mezu v. Morgan State Univ., 269 F.R.D. 565, 570–71 (D. Md. 2010).
8. No. 1:05-cv-1670-LJM-JMS, 2009 WL 1605118 (S.D. Ind. June 5, 2009).
9. Id. at *1, *3.
10. See id. at *5. Ironically, the FOIA request was necessary because BME attorneys refused to certify the
authenticity of the documents. See id.
11. Id. 1100 West learned that BME had received a copy of the EPA file in August 2007. Id. Later in
discovery, BME confirmed that some of the documents had been contained in Red Spot files that had not
previously been reviewed and produced. Id. at *24 (noting that some of the EPA documents were in the boxes
and file cabinets that Red Spot did not review and produce in discovery).
12. Id. at *5.
13. Id. at *6–9.
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advised Red Spot to obtain separate counsel.14 In December 2008, Red Spot’s
new attorneys produced 70,000 responsive documents from sixty-eight boxes
and two filing cabinets, including numerous documents reflecting the use of PCE
and TCE on the property.15 Discovery concerning the discovery misconduct
revealed that in May 2006, BME attorneys had concerns about the completeness
of their document production, with one attorney characterizing the issue as “a
little bit scary” and another suggesting, “I think someone needs to go hold [the
client’s] hand for a day for a comprehensive file search . . . .”16 Nonetheless, in
June 2006, when a BME attorney was given access to the client’s documents, the
attorney apparently did not conduct a search for responsive documents or guide
the client in conducting such a search.17 BME later conceded its attorneys had
failed to produce responsive documents.18
In this and numerous other cases of discovery misconduct, federal courts must
decide which consequences should be imposed to punish and deter future
misconduct. Federal judges have increasingly turned to sanctions,19 but not professional discipline.20
That was the case in 1100 West. After reviewing the discovery misconduct in
the case, the court entered a default judgment against Red Spot and ordered Red
Spot and BME to each pay half of 1100 West’s attorneys’ fees and costs for
discovery during a three-year period.21 The court detailed Red Spot’s efforts to
hide its use of TCE and PCE and then turned to the role played by BME
attorneys, stating “BME [attorneys] had opportunities to steer Red Spot . . . on a
different path and [they] never did.”22 The court explained that the attorneys
knew enough information by June 2006 that they should have guided their client
to make complete disclosure in discovery.23 Noting the BME attorneys’ questions
14. Id. at *9.
15. Id. at *10–11. In February and April 2009, Red Spot produced additional responsive documents. Id. at
*11, *19.
16. Id. at *22–23. The court allowed discovery of attorney-client privileged communications upon
determining Red Spot had waived the privilege through discovery fraud. Id. at *10. Also during this time period,
BME attorneys were aware that some Red Spot witnesses had recollections regarding the use of TCE and PCE
but that Red Spot’s 30(b)(6) designee did not provide this information in her deposition and Red Spot’s
interrogatory answers did not reference that information. Id. at *11–19.
17. See id. at *23.
18. Id. at *1. The firm argued that it should not be sanctioned because it had relied upon its client and “once
the firm knew of the potential misconduct [by two firm attorneys], it promptly took steps [to] remove those
lawyers from the firm and cooperated fully with 1100 West.” Id.
19. Willoughby et al., supra note 3, at 790–91 (describing the significant increase in ediscovery-related
motions for sanctions and awards since 2004); DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND ET AL., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
LITIGATION 416 (2d ed. 2016) (noting the “plentiful” sanctions rulings in the ediscovery era); see also infra notes
99–102 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part III.
21. 1100 W., 2009 WL 1605118, at *35. The order also required Red Spot and BME to pay attorneys’ fees and
costs associated with certain other motions and hearings. Id.
22. Id. at *32.
23. See id. at *33.
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about the completeness of the document production and their physical visit to the
room where the responsive documents were located, the court concluded that
BME had an obligation to “insist that Red Spot dig deeper.”24 The court
acknowledged it is rare to hold a law firm accountable for violating the FRCP, but
determined it was necessary to deter future misconduct.25
The attorneys in the 1100 West case did not face professional discipline for
their egregious discovery misconduct.26 Most attorneys who engage in document
discovery misconduct do not.27 This is the case even though professional conduct
rules prohibit every aspect of discovery abuse, from failure to produce requested
documents to spoliation of evidence.28 Further, most federal courts have their
own disciplinary systems,29 and judges and lawyers alike have an ethical
obligation to report attorney misconduct.30 Though the tools are in place, the
discipline system is not being used to address pervasive discovery misconduct.31
This Article argues that federal courts could make more effective use of
attorney discipline systems to improve document discovery in civil cases. What
will be effective depends on why discovery misconduct occurs. There are
multiple reasons why lawyers may engage in such misconduct—from ignorance
of the rules to intentional, calculated violation of the law. The best explanation for
most discovery misconduct, though, is that lawyers do not think they are doing
anything wrong.
Behavioral legal ethics explains how cognitive bias, situational pressures, and
other factors influence attorney behavior in discovery. This Article makes the
case that federal judges could counteract these factors—and perhaps even
harness the power of behavioral science—by consistently educating attorneys
about discovery expectations and consistently imposing disciplinary consequences for discovery misconduct. These changes could fundamentally change
the way lawyers conduct discovery. While some may argue that consistent
imposition of sanctions could have the same impact, the Article presents the
reasons attorney discipline is superior to sanctions alone.
Following this Introduction, Part I describes common areas of attorney
misconduct in document discovery in civil litigation in federal court. This
discussion explains the governing procedural rules and other law and provides
examples of how attorneys regularly violate their legal obligations in each area.

24. Id. at *34.
25. Id. at *35. The sanction was not entered against the individual attorneys. Id.
26. Research for discipline records included a Westlaw search in both the Northern District of Indiana and
Indiana state court, as well as a search for discipline records in the online database, “Indiana Roll of Attorneys.”
27. See infra Part III.
28. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a), 3.4(c)–(d) (2016) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]; see also
discussion infra notes 103–14 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 118–19 and accompanying text.
30. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
31. See infra Part III.
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This Part concludes by discussing the availability of sanctions and the rise in their
use in recent years. With that foundation, Part II explains the professional
conduct rules pertinent to document discovery practice and the discipline systems
that could be used to address misconduct. Thereafter, Part III considers the dearth
of document discovery-related disciplinary proceedings originating from misconduct in federal court. A contributing factor to the lack of discipline appears to be
the low number of disciplinary referrals. Part IV discusses the reasons attorneys
do not report the discovery misconduct of opposing counsel and the somewhat
different reasons judges do not make discipline referrals.
With this understanding of the lack of discipline and some of the reasons for it,
Part V argues for reform, explaining the appropriate cases for discipline referrals,
how behavioral legal ethics research should influence judges to consistently turn
to the discipline system, and the advantages of discipline over sanctions alone.
Then, Part VI discusses three different settings in which discovery discipline
reform could be achieved: at the judge-level, court-level, and nationally. This
Part considers specific ideas for implementing change in each setting and the
reasons some of these avenues may be more effective than others.

I. ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL CIVIL DOCUMENT DISCOVERY
PRACTICE AND THE AVAILABILITY AND USE OF SANCTIONS TO COMBAT IT
The basic framework of discovery in a civil case in federal court has been the
same since the adoption of the FRCP in 1938.32 A party may request that an
opponent produce documents within the scope of discovery, which generally
encompasses documents that are nonprivileged, relevant, and (as more recently
delineated) proportional to the needs of the case.33 A party to whom a request is
made then has the opportunity to object to any improper requests for production,
review its own documents to determine which are responsive to the request (but
not objectionable), and produce those non-objectionable documents.34 The
default rule is that the responding party pays the costs associated with responding
to a discovery request.35
When a responding party does not produce documents that the requesting party
believes it is entitled to receive, the requesting party can file a motion to

32. See generally Milberg LLP & Hausfeld LLP, E-Discovery Today: The Fault Lies Not in Our Rules . . . , 4
FED. CTS. L. REV. 131, 137–44 (2011) (explaining the role of discovery in federal court since the rules were
adopted in 1938).
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), 34; see also infra notes 48–49.
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
35. See Oppenheimer Fund Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (explaining that the responding party
ordinarily bears the cost).
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compel.36 Though filed by the requesting party, a motion to compel is a vehicle
for both parties to argue about the impropriety of the opponent’s conduct. The
requesting party will assert that it is entitled to withheld documents and that any
objections to their production are not justified,37 while the responding party will
argue that an opponent’s requests seek documents beyond the scope of discovery
or documents otherwise protected from discovery.38 Either a requesting or
responding party (and the party’s attorney) can be sanctioned for failing to
comply with their discovery obligations.39
In the 1990s, the advent of email and desktop computers resulted in an
explosion of electronic documents.40 The new volume of information was a
discovery game changer in terms of cost, complexity, and number of discovery
disputes.41 The 2006 amendments to the FRCP clarified that an electronic
document is a document to which the ordinary rules of discovery apply.42 The
2015 amendments attempted to address some problems that had intensified in the
ediscovery era, but did not alter the basic framework for discovery.43
The following discussion considers common areas of attorney misconduct in
document discovery practice. Each section describes the applicable FRCP
provisions and other sources of authority and numerous examples of how
attorneys frequently run afoul of this authority. This Part concludes with a
discussion of the availability of sanctions for noncompliance with the discovery
rules and the rise in the imposition of sanctions in recent years. This survey of the
landscape is foundational for considering the issue addressed in the remainder of
this Article: in what circumstances should attorneys face professional discipline
for their role in document discovery misconduct?

36. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(B). Alternatively, the party from whom discovery is requested could seek a
protective order, which in this context would be a ruling that the requesting party is not entitled to receive the
requested discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)–(4).
38. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(B) (“If a motion [to compel] is denied, the court may issue any protective
order authorized [by FRCP 26(c)] . . . .”).
39. Sanctions may be entered under the authority of the FRCP, a court’s inherent power, or statutory
authority. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (stating that attorney who “so multiplies the proceedings . . . unreasonably and vexatiously” can be required to pay excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees); FED.
R. CIV. P. 26(c), 26(g), 37(a)–(b); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991) (courts have inherent
authority to “fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process”).
40. Damian Vargas, Note and Comment, Electronic Discovery: 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 34 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 396, 397 (2008) (explaining that the proliferation of
computers and email resulted in an explosion of electronic information).
41. Willoughby et al., supra note 3, at 792 (describing document discovery in the ediscovery era as “more
expensive, more complicated, and more contentious than ever”).
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (describing party’s right to request “documents or electronically stored
information”); see also Vargas, supra note 40, at 408–14 (describing 2006 amendments to the FRCP).
43. See generally Reports of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to the Judicial Conference of
the United States accompanying Letters from Honorable John G. Roberts to the Honorable John A. Boehner and
Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (Apr. 29, 2015) (submitting to Congress 2015 amendments to the FRCP).
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A. OVERBROAD REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

One area of discovery conflict—and potential attorney misconduct—concerns
parties making overbroad document requests. In a system in which the producing
party pays the cost of complying with an opponent’s discovery requests, the
breadth of discovery requests can have a significant impact on the cost of a
case.44 This problem is amplified in the ediscovery era when humans seldom
have a thought that is not recorded in an electronic document. When all of those
emails, texts, instant messages, and voicemails are relevant or potentially
relevant to an issue in a case, costs of production can be high.45
Historically, courts and counsel viewed the scope of discovery as broad.
Parties generally had the right to seek discovery of all nonprivileged information
relevant to a claim or defense.46 But there are two key limits on a party’s
entitlement to all nonprivileged information relevant to a claim. The first is
proportionality. Though concepts of proportionality have been incorporated in
the FRCP since 1983,47 it was not until 2015 that the rules were rewritten to limit
the scope of discovery to information that is both relevant and proportional to the
needs of the case.48 The goal of these amendments is for parties and ultimately
courts to rein in the reach (and cost) of discovery.49 By incorporating proportionality into the text of the scope rule, the hope is that judges will no longer revert to
the mantra that requested documents should be produced because parties have a

44. See Jacqueline Hoelting, Note, Skin in the Game: Litigation Incentives Changing as Courts Embrace a
“Loser Pays” Rule for E-Discovery Costs, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1114 (2013) (asserting that “[p]laintiffs
have taken advantage of [the rule that the producing party pays] by submitting overly broad and expensive
requests” for production).
45. Id. at 1112–13.
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2014) (amended 2015). Prior to 2015, Rule 26(b)(1) further reinforced this idea
of broad discovery by explaining that a document request is not objectionable because it seeks documents
inadmissible in evidence, so long as the request is “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.” Id.
47. Jennifer Nicholls, Comment, A Proportional Response: Amending the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure
to Minimize Abusive Discovery Practices, 89 OR. L. REV. 1445, 1452–56 (2011) (tracing the origin and evolution of references to proportionality in the FRCP).
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of
the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information,
the parties’ resources, the importance of discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense
of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”). A corresponding change was made to Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (where the proportionality language was previously located) to state that a court must limit
discovery if it determines that “the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (“The present [proportionality]
amendment again reflects the need for continuing and close judicial involvement in the cases that do not yield
readily to the ideal of effective party management.”).
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right to broad discovery,50 but will instead engage in analysis of the benefits and
burdens associated with a party’s request for production, limiting requests as
appropriate under that standard.51
The second limit is the discovery certification requirement found in FRCP
26(g).52 The rule requires counsel seeking discovery to certify that the request is
not made for an improper purpose53 and that the request is “neither unreasonable
nor unduly burdensome or expensive.”54 This rule has been described as
“aspir[ing] to eliminate one of the most prevalent of all discovery abuses:
kneejerk discovery requests served without consideration of cost or burden to the
responding party.”55
While some requests for production are clearly overbroad,56 in many cases it
can be difficult to know the line between proportional and improper discovery
requests. Because a responding attorney can object to discovery that it believes
crosses the line and not produce documents unless ordered to do so by a court,57 a
proactive attorney and court can control the costs of overbroad discovery.58
B. A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY REGARDING THE SPECIFIC BASIS FOR
OBJECTIONS AND CONCERNING DOCUMENTS PRODUCED OR WITHHELD

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of document discovery is the necessary
dependence upon opposing counsel to respond to requests for production.
Typically, a party responding to a document request does not open up its files and
allow the requesting attorney to determine which documents are responsive to its

50. See, e.g., Convertino v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 565 F. Supp. 2d 10, 12 (D.D.C. 2008) (“The scope of
discovery in civil actions is broad, allowing for discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
a claim or defense.”).
51. See generally KROLL ONTRACK, 6 MONTHS OF CASE LAW UNDER THE NEW FRCP 7 (2016) (ebook),
http://www.ediscovery.com/cms/pdf/caselawfrcp_ebook_krollontrack2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ANTBNY6] (explaining the amendment is intended to encourage judges to play a more active role, to consider
proportionality up front and not tolerate broad discovery requests). But see Wit v. United Behavioral Health, No.
14-cv-02346-JCS, 2016 WL 258604, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2016) (“Traditionally, the relevance requirement
of Rule 26(b)(1) has been construed broadly.”).
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g).
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(ii) (defining improper purpose as including a purpose “such as to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation”).
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii) (factors listed in the rule as relevant to this determination are “the needs of
the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the
action”).
55. Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 358 (D. Md. 2008).
56. See, e.g., Edelen v. Campbell Soup Co., No. 1:08-cv-00299-JOF-LTW, 2009 WL 4798117, at *2 (N.D.
Ga. Dec. 8, 2009) (describing a “blanket request” for all information on laptops of numerous company
executives as “on its face overbroad”).
57. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34, 37; see also 8A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2207, at 386–87 (2d ed. 1994) (“If the request is objected to, it is for the discovering party to decide whether to
pursue the matter further.”).
58. See, e.g., Witt v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 307 F.R.D. 554, 569 (D. Colo. 2014) (“I am loath to require
additional answers to unfocused or broadly drafted . . . requests for production.”).
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requests.59 Instead, the requesting party must rely upon the responding party’s
attorney to fairly interpret the requests, to transparently describe legitimate,
specific objections relied upon in withholding any documents from the production, and to diligently identify and produce documents that are responsive (i.e.,
requested and not objectionable) to the requests.60 There is not a “nonresponsive” log where the responding attorney describes the documents it has
withheld (or not searched for) based on its objections, so there is no simple way
for the requesting party to identify an adversary’s decision not to produce a
valuable document.61
Without transparency, the requesting party cannot know if it should be troubled
by and challenge the decisions or conduct of opposing counsel. To that end, the
2015 amendments to the FRCP clarify that objections must be stated “with
specificity”62 and that “[a]n objection must state whether any responsive
materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.”63 But even before
those amendments, non-specific objections were inconsistent with the requirements of Rule 34.64 Further, FRCP 26(g) requires an attorney to certify that to the
best of his or her “knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable
inquiry” the discovery responses and objections are consistent with the rules and
applicable law and are “not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.”65
U.S. Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm has discussed that the purpose of this
certification is to address the abusive practice of “objecting to discovery requests
reflexively—but not reflectively—and without a factual basis.”66

59. The rules reference producing documents for inspection or copying by an opponent. FED. R. CIV. P.
34(a)(1). In practice, parties generally copy documents and produce those copies to the opponent. The 2015
amendments specifically reference this practice. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B) (“The responding party may
state that it will produce copies of documents or of electronically stored information instead of permitting
inspection.”).
60. See Witt, 307 F.R.D. at 561 (explaining that the responding party must object “with specificity,” “explain
and support its objections,” and “[m]ost importantly . . . answer to the extent a discovery request is not
objectionable”).
61. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(A) (requiring attorneys to create a privilege log, describing documents
withheld on the basis of privilege or work product protection).
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B).
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(C); see also id. advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (“An objection
that states the limits that have controlled the search for responsive and relevant materials qualifies as a statement
that the materials have been ‘withheld.’”).
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B)–(C) (2014) (amended 2015); see also Panola Land Buyers Ass’n v. Shuman,
762 F.2d 1550, 1559 (11th Cir. 1985) (explaining that discovery objections must be “plain enough and specific
enough so that the court can understand in what way the [discovery is] alleged to be objectionable” (quoting
Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981)); PLX, Inc. v. Prosystems, Inc., 220 F.R.D. 291, 293
(N.D.W. Va. 2004) (“The mere recitation of the familiar litany that [a] . . . document production request is
overly broad, burdensome, oppressive and irrelevant will not suffice.” (quoting Momath v. Albert Einstein Med.
Ctr., 164 F.R.D. 412, 417 (E.D. Pa. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g).
66. Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 358 (D. Md. 2008).
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A boilerplate (or non-specific) objection67 might provide: “[Party] objects to
the extent this request seeks irrelevant documents and to the extent the request is
overly broad and unduly burdensome. Subject to and without waiving these
objections, responsive, non-objectionable documents, if any, will be produced.”68
Such objections may be asserted in a “general objection” section or used in
response to several (or all) of an opponent’s requests for production.69 When
attorneys make objections like this, opposing counsel does not know if any
responsive material is actually being withheld on the basis of the objection, and if
so, how decisions about what to withhold and what to produce were made.70
As a result of boilerplate objections, one of two bad scenarios may occur,71
though the second is substantially worse than the first. In the first scenario, the
attorney who receives the boilerplate objections spends time and money filing a
motion to compel to seek any documents withheld based on the objections.72 In
turn, this creates a burden for the court system and ultimately an order resolving
the issue (typically finding the objections waived and ordering any documents
withheld on that basis produced).73 In the second scenario, the objecting attorney
(in his or her mind, but not on paper) justified withholding responsive documents
based on the vague, boilerplate objections, but the requesting attorney does not

67. Matthew L. Jarvey, Note, Boilerplate Discovery Objections: How They Are Used, Why They Are Wrong,
and What We Can Do About Them, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 913, 914 (2013) (describing a boilerplate objection as one
that does not specify “how the discovery request is deficient” or “how the objecting party would be harmed if it
were forced to respond”).
68. Id. at 914–15 (noting boilerplate objections include that a request is “irrelevant” or “overly broad”
without including an explanation why).
69. See, e.g., id. at 915 (explaining that boilerplate objections are often “used repetitively, in response to
several requests”). But see, e.g., Swackhammer v. Sprint Corp. PCS, 225 F.R.D. 658, 660–61 (D. Kan. 2004)
(“This Court has . . . disapproved of the practice of asserting a general objection ‘to the extent’ it may apply to
particular requests for discovery. [Such an objection is] worthless for anything beyond delay of the discovery.”).
70. Weems v. Hodnett, No. 10-cv-1452, 2011 WL 3100554, at *1 (W.D. La. July 25, 2011) (explaining that
boilerplate objections “waste [the] time [of] opposing counsel and the court [because] it is impossible to know
whether information has been withheld and, if so, why”).
71. A third—and not bad—result is that the requesting party does not challenge the boilerplate objections
and the objecting attorney was not actually withholding any documents based on those objections.
Undoubtedly, this occurs in countless cases. The problem is that the requesting party has no way of knowing if
her choice not to file a motion to compel was a good one (because no documents were withheld) or a bad one
(because documents were withheld based on the objections).
72. See, e.g., Atlas Res. Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F.R.D. 482, 489–90 (D.N.M. 2011) (ruling that
Liberty’s blanket objections were improper, that the objections were waived, and that any documents withheld
on the basis of objections must be produced); Sunnen Prods. Co. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., No.
4:09CV00889 JCH, 2010 WL 743633, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 25, 2010) (court overruled all boilerplate objections
in ruling on motion to compel); Frontier-Kemper Constructors, Inc. v. Elk Run Coal Co., 246 F.R.D. 522,
527–28 (S.D.W. Va. 2007) (finding defendant did not comply with FRCP 34 and thereby waived its generic and
nonspecific objections to requests for production); DL v. District of Columbia, 251 F.R.D. 38, 43 (D.D.C. 2008)
(explaining that defendant’s boilerplate general objections provide “no indication as to the specific nature or
amount of material being withheld on the basis of the general objections”); Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D.
466, 495 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (ordering the City of Dallas to provide every attorney that represents it in federal
court a copy of the order explaining why the City’s boilerplate objections are improper).
73. Supra note 72.
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realize documents are being withheld, does not pursue a motion to compel, and is
prejudiced by never (or only belatedly) receiving the documents deceptively
withheld.74 In both of these scenarios, the requesting party is harmed by the lack
of transparency that is part and parcel of non-specific objections.75
In terms of the document production itself, a requesting party usually has no
choice but to assume that the responding attorney (and party) exercised care and
diligence in identifying and producing responsive documents.76 Problems occur
when responding attorneys and their clients intentionally withhold responsive
documents or act negligently in identifying and producing responsive documents.77 The requesting party will be prejudiced by the non-production or delay

74. See, e.g., Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932, at *8 (S.D. Cal.
Jan. 7, 2008) (objections and responses to request for production appeared to signal that requested documents
would be produced, thus, no motion to compel was filed; however, attorneys interpreted their objections and
responses as justifying nonproduction of documents). The hazards of a lack of transparency in objections is
highlighted by the attorney’s explanation of how he interpreted his own objections in justifying non-production
of key documents in the case:
With respect to Request for Production No. 50, Qualcomm viewed that request as overbroad. The only
standard relevant to this case was the H.264 standard for video compression (also known as the
ISO/IEC MPEG-4 Part 10 standard, as explained above). The two patents-in-suit, however, claim
technologies beyond the specific video compression technology that was at issue in this case. I was
aware that there could be standards beyond H.264 that related to the processing of video signals and to
the two patents-in-suit, potentially including standards created by the same standards-setting
organization that created the H.264 standard. For that reason, the responses include objections on
grounds of relevance, and express Qualcomm’s commitment to produce documents given to or
received from the standards-setting organization that created the H.264 standard, and that concerned
Qualcomm’s involvement in setting that standard. I believed in good faith that this response limited
Qualcomm’s production commitment to include all documents that were both responsive to the
request and relevant to the case. I also believed that the response made it clear to counsel for
Broadcom what counsel for Qualcomm believed was relevant and would be produced.
Declaration of Non-party Christian E. Mammen in Response to Order to Show Cause Why Sanctions Should
Not Be Imposed at ¶ 27(c), Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 2007 WL 3005523 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (No.
05CV1958-B (BLM)); see also infra note 129 for subsequent history in the Qualcomm case.
75. While some attorneys make these objections to deceive, many others do it out of habit or because they
think it is necessary to preserve objections. See Anderson v. Caldwell Cty. Sheriff’s Office, No. 1:09cv423, 2011
WL 2414140, at *3 (W.D.N.C. June 10, 2011) (explaining that the FRCP does not allow parties to make
objections for the purpose of preserving them). Regardless of the motive, all attorneys who make boilerplate
objections are not being transparent about what they are doing and why, and as a result, they are creating a
problem.
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (responding party has duty to produce documents requested if no objection is made).
Unless the responding party asserts an objection or otherwise gives opposing counsel specific reason for
concern that a document production is incomplete, there is no basis for filing a motion to compel.
77. See, e.g., Sun River Energy, Inc. v. Nelson, 800 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir. 2015) (counsel did not
produce relevant insurance policy because attorney did not review the policy to determine its relevance); Witt v.
GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 307 F.R.D. 554, 568–69 (D. Colo. 2014) (explaining that attorney has an obligation to
“conduct a reasonable search for responsive information” and that defense counsel failed to produce responsive
documents, and imposing $500 sanction for violating FRCP 26(g)); 1100 W., LLC v. Red Spot Paint & Varnish
Co., No. 1:05-cv-1670-LJM-JMS, 2009 WL 1605118, at *11, *33 (S.D. Ind. June 5, 2009) (defendant belatedly
produced thousands of responsive documents related to the key issue in the case, and facts revealed that
attorneys had concerns about completeness of document production but did not index or review sixty-eight
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in production as it conducts other discovery and prepares for trial without
knowing the information is missing.78
C. NEGLIGENT OR INTENTIONAL SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE

As a matter of common law, when a party reasonably anticipates litigation, the
party has an obligation to preserve documents discoverable by an opponent in
that litigation.79 Failure to fulfill this duty (whether through intentional or
negligent conduct) is termed spoliation.80
The information age has complicated issues of preservation. In modern
litigation, preservation is no longer as simple as counsel taking custody of a
client’s folder or box of documents related to the contract, real estate venture, or
fired employee. Instead, an attorney must issue, provide guidance regarding, and
monitor a litigation hold—a directive to a party to litigation (and its employees if
applicable) that the party must preserve and not delete or destroy discoverable
information.81 The relatively easy part for an attorney should be issuing a written
litigation hold to a client (and for an entity client, its key players) to preserve
discoverable information.82 The more difficult part of preservation is working
with the client to identify discoverable information in its various locations so that
it can be collected and preserved.83

boxes and two filing cabinets of documents in defendant’s possession); R & R Sails Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 251
F.R.D. 520, 524–25 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (determining that defendant’s counsel did not make a reasonable inquiry
into whether it had documents responsive to plaintiff’s requests for production); Poole ex rel. Elliott v. Textron,
Inc., 192 F.R.D. 494, 505 (D. Md. 2000) (explaining the initial search was inadequate as evidenced by
documents produced following a court order).
78. Sun River, 800 F.3d at 1222 (coverage had lapsed under insurance policy by the time it was belatedly
produced); Atlas Res. Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F.R.D. 482, 490 (D.N.M. 2011) (plaintiff learned in
deposition that documents a witness had turned over to the defendant, and that defendant had been ordered to
produce, were not produced to plaintiff); 1100 W., 2009 WL 1605118, at *35 (as sanction for belated production
of thousands of responsive documents and other discovery misconduct, court sanctioned defendant and its
lawyers to pay attorneys’ fees and costs for discovery from May 23, 2006 to June 5, 2009); Poole, 192 F.R.D. at
507 (“[T]here is an unquantifiable but real prejudice to plaintiff in the motions practice that Textron’s conduct
necessitated and the . . . disadvantages of the delayed . . . discovery that was its consequence.”).
79. Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001).
80. Graff v. Baja Marine Corp., 310 F. App’x 298, 301 (11th Cir. 2009) (defining spoliation as the
“destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another’s use as
evidence in pending or reasonably anticipated litigation” (quoting West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167
F.3d 776, 779 (2d. Cir. 1999)).
81. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Once a party reasonably
anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy and put in place a
‘litigation hold’ to ensure the preservation of relevant documents.”).
82. Even though this should be the easy part, attorneys sometimes fail to issue litigation holds or fail to
communicate the hold to the appropriate people. See, e.g., Knickerbocker v. Corinthian Colls., 298 F.R.D. 670,
674 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (counsel for defendant did not issue a company-wide litigation hold, resulting in email
accounts being deleted).
83. Nacco Materials Handling Grp., Inc. v. Lilly Co., 278 F.R.D. 395, 398, 404 (W.D. Tenn. 2011) (counsel
issued written litigation hold to client’s president, but did nothing to ensure that discoverable information was
identified and preserved); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Neb. v. BASF Corp., No. 4:04CV3356, 2007 WL
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Without a proper effort by both attorney and client to identify and preserve
discoverable information, information can be lost. It may be deleted through
some automatic computer process.84 Or information may be deleted intentionally—by a client who does not understand the legal obligation to preserve it and
the consequences of failing to do so (or who is willing to take the chance).85
Traditionally, courts relied upon inherent authority to sanction spoliation,86
which resulted in varying approaches to the severity of sanctions imposed for
non-intentional spoliation.87 In 2015, FRCP 37(e) was amended88 to make severe
sanctions (like adverse inference instructions, default, and dismissal) available
only for intentional spoliation.89 Less severe sanctions are available when a party
is prejudiced by an opposing party’s non-intentional spoliation of evidence.90 The
rule does not contain a provision addressing sanctions against an attorney for
spoliation.91

3342423, at *4 (D. Neb. Nov. 5, 2007) (attorney requested “documents” from key employee of plaintiff, who
did not understand the request to encompass electronic information, resulting in information being deleted and
belatedly collected).
84. See, e.g., Knickerbocker, 298 F.R.D. at 674 (explaining that the process to automatically delete
terminated employees’ email accounts should have been suspended in light of EEOC notices, but was not,
resulting in deletion of accounts); Nacco, 278 F.R.D. at 405 (finding it probable that relevant ESI such as
Internet history and server logs were lost by defendant’s failure to copy data on its server or preserve backup
tapes at the time its preservation duty attached); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 2007 WL 3342423, at *4
(explaining that the University’s computer system deleted some emails automatically if not preserved).
85. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 2007 WL 3342423, at *4 & n.2 (key employee of plaintiff was not
told that he should preserve ESI, so he preserved only “what he deemed was important” and “deleted what he
viewed as unimportant”); HM Elecs., Inc. v. R.F. Techs., Inc., No. 12CV2884-BAS-MDD, 2015 WL 4714908,
at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2015), vacated in part, No. 12-CV-2884-BAS-MDD, 2016 WL 1267385 (S.D. Cal. Mar.
15, 2016) (defendant’s CEO instructed employees to destroy documents relevant to the suit and attorneys did
not implement a litigation hold or communicate the importance of preserving documents).
86. Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 360 F.3d 446, 449 (4th Cir. 2004).
87. Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 478
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (adverse inference instruction appropriate for spoliation caused by gross negligence of party);
Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 614–19 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (explaining that
severe sanctions are not appropriate in the absence of bad faith conduct and a finding of prejudice).
88. The previous version of the Rule did not provide for spoliation sanctions, but instead provided that courts
should not impose sanctions on a party for failing to produce electronically stored information “lost as a result of
the routine, good faith operation of an electronic information system.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (2014).
89. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); see, e.g., Orchestratehr, Inc. v. Trombetta, No. 3:13-cv-2110-P, 2016 WL 1555784,
at *9–13 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (denying request for adverse inference instruction despite “troubling” evidence
concerning deletion of emails, finding that plaintiffs failed to establish defendant acted with the intent required
by FRCP 37(e)).
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
91. Id. A court inclined to sanction an attorney for spoliation could rely upon its inherent authority. See supra
note 86.
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D. SANCTIONING ATTORNEY AND CLIENT CONDUCT IN DOCUMENT
DISCOVERY

The prevailing party in a motion to compel may seek sanctions against
opposing counsel and the opposing party.92 A party may also seek sanctions on
the basis that an opponent has failed or refused to produce documents despite
previously being ordered to do so (such as in a scheduling order or an order
compelling production).93 And as discussed above, sanctions can also be
requested for an opponent’s spoliation of evidence.94 A party can seek sanctions
against both opposing counsel and party on the grounds that the party’s discovery
request, response, or objection violates the certification requirement of FRCP
26(g).95
Beyond the FRCP, federal courts have statutory authority to impose sanctions
against an attorney for vexatiously increasing the cost of litigation.96 In cases
involving bad faith and when no other rule provision provides the authority to
sanction, federal courts may rely upon their inherent authority to sanction
discovery misconduct.97
The use of sanctions to address discovery misconduct has increased through
the years. In 1983, FRCP 26 was amended with the goal that increased
availability of discovery sanctions would end discovery misconduct.98 It was not
until the dawn of the ediscovery era, though, that federal courts began to sanction

92. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5) (if a motion to compel is granted, the party, attorney, or both may be ordered to
pay the moving party’s expenses of making the motion, including attorneys’ fees; if it is denied—such as
because the document requests were improper—then the moving party, attorney, or both may be ordered to pay
the non-moving party’s expenses of opposing the motion).
93. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2) (party can be sanctioned for not obeying a discovery order, such as a scheduling
order consistent with the parties’ 26(f) discovery plan or an order compelling discovery under Rule 37(a)); see,
e.g., Granados v. Traffic Bar & Rest., Inc., No. 13 Civ. 0500 (TPG) (JCF), 2016 WL 1317988, at *1, *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016) (sanctioning attorney and clients for noncompliance with order compelling production
of documents); Porter Bridge Loan Co. v. Hentges, No. 09-CV-593-JED-FHM, 2013 WL 1412372, at *5–7
(N.D. Okla. 2013) (affirming magistrate judge’s order sanctioning attorney and client for violating prior court
order compelling production of documents); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb. v. BASF Corp., No. 4:04CV3356,
2007 WL 3342423, at *1, *5–6 (D. Neb. Nov. 5, 2007) (sanctioning client for failure to comply with order
compelling production, noting the delays caused in the case, loss of confidence that all relevant documents have
been produced, and “the gnawing question of whether relevant documents . . . [were] destroyed”).
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B), 26(g)(3) (sanctions for improper certification of discovery request, response,
or objection).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (attorney who “so multiplies the proceedings . . . unreasonably and vexatiously” can be required to pay excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees).
97. Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991).
98. Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Antidote for an Opponent’s Pretrial Discovery Misconduct: Treating the
Misconduct at Trial as an Admission by Conduct of the Weakness of the Opponent’s Case, 1993 BYU L. REV.
793, 795 (“[T]he [1983] amendments were intended to encourage judges to punish discovery misconduct by
imposing sanctions more aggressively. It was hoped that the sanctions ‘movement’ would discourage
obstructionism.”).
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discovery misconduct with some frequency.99 For example, 2009 saw more cases
in which parties sought ediscovery sanctions than all years leading up to 2005
combined.100 In their seminal article on the increase in discovery sanctions in the
ediscovery era, attorneys Dan Willoughby, Rose Hunter Jones, and Gregory
Antine asserted: “We identified no case in which a court inclined to impose a
sanction was unable to do so because particular rules or statutory requirements
were not met.”101

II. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULES AND DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS
In most jurisdictions, Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 3.4 is the rule most
pertinent to document discovery misconduct.102 The District of Columbia and
every state but California103 has adopted a rule patterned on Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.4104 (though a handful of adopting states have deleted
some of the rule’s provisions relevant to document discovery misconduct).105
Federal courts typically adopt the professional conduct rules of the state in which
the court is located;106 thus, most attorneys practicing in federal court are
obligated to comply with some version of Model Rule 3.4.107

99. Willoughby et al., supra note 3, at 790–91 (describing the significant increase in ediscovery sanctions
motions and awards since 2004).
100. Id. at 794.
101. Id. at 798–99.
102. See Paula Schaefer, State Professional Conduct Rules Concerning Fairness to Opposing Party and
Counsel, http://www.pierceprofessionalresponsibility.com/index.asp [https://perma.cc/NJS4-JE54] [hereinafter
Schaefer, State Professional Conduct Rules].
103. The California professional conduct rule pertinent to document discovery provides, “A member shall
not suppress any evidence that the member or the member’s client has a legal obligation to reveal or to
produce.” CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5-220 (2015).
104. Schaefer, State Professional Conduct Rules, supra note 102.
105. Id. (showing that Alabama, Maine, and Texas have no provision identical or substantially similar to
Model Rule 3.4(d); that Georgia, Illinois, and Pennsylvania have no provision identical or substantially similar
to Model Rule 3.4(c) and (d); and that New York’s rule does not closely track the language of Model Rule 3.4).
106. See Paula Schaefer, Federal District Court Professional Conduct Rules and Discipline Provisions,
http://www.pierceprofessionalresponsibility.com/index.asp [https://perma.cc/NJS4-JE54] [hereinafter Schaefer,
Federal Chart]; see, e.g., E.D. TENN. LOC. R. 83.6 (adopting Tennessee rules of professional conduct).
107. Some federal courts have not adopted professional conduct rules. See Schaefer, Federal Chart, supra
note 106 (showing that no professional conduct rules have been adopted by the Eastern and Western District of
Arkansas, the Northern District of Illinois, the Eastern and Western District of Kentucky, the Northern District
of New York, the District of North Dakota, the District of South Dakota, the District of Vermont, the Western
District of Virginia, and the Western District of Wisconsin). The professional conduct rule addressing choice of
law provides that the “rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide
otherwise” apply for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal. MODEL RULES R. 8.5(b).
Thus, the state professional conduct rules for the state in which the court is located would appear to apply in the
absence of adopting different rules.
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Model Rule 3.4 addresses all of the major categories of discovery misconduct
that were addressed in Part I.108 Subpart (a) addresses the issue of spoliation of
evidence, as well as failure to produce documents.109 It prohibits a lawyer from
unlawfully obstructing a party’s access to evidence or unlawfully altering,
destroying, or concealing evidence.110 The next subpart applicable to document
discovery is (c), which provides that an attorney shall not “knowingly disobey an
obligation under the rules of a tribunal,” other than an open refusal to do so
asserting no valid obligation exists.111 Subpart (d) deals with improper requests
and responses to document discovery, prohibiting “mak[ing] a frivolous discovery request or fail[ing] to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally
proper discovery request by an opposing party.”112 In short, RPC 3.4 is not just a
hortatory rule. It is specific and its violation is susceptible to being proven in a
disciplinary proceeding.113
Both judges and attorneys have an obligation to report professional misconduct to disciplinary authorities in defined circumstances.114 Discovery misconduct that occurs in federal court could be reported to (and ultimately disciplined
by) the federal court’s own disciplinary system or the disciplinary authorities in
the state where the attorney is licensed.115 A federal court has the authority to
discipline attorneys admitted to practice before the court.116 Most federal district
courts have adopted local rules establishing a disciplinary system.117 Only a

108. See Paul W. Grimm & Joel P. Williams, Ethical Issues Associated with Preserving, Accessing,
Discovering, and Using Electronically Stored Information, 14 FIDELITY L.J. 57, 58–63 (2008) (explaining that
Rule 3.4(a) is most pertinent to the issue of ESI preservation).
109. MODEL RULES R. 3.4(a) (“A lawyer shall not unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or
unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer
shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act.”).
110. MODEL RULES R. 3.4(a).
111. MODEL RULES R. 3.4(c).
112. MODEL RULES R. 3.4(d).
113. Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody’s Watching: Legal Advertising as a Case Study of
the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 971, 997–1001 (2002) (discussing hortatory
professional conduct rules that are unenforceable and enforceable rules that are under-enforced) [hereinafter
Zacharias, Nobody’s Watching].
114. MODEL RULES R. 8.3; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES, Canon 3(B)(5); see also infra Part IV.
115. See, e.g., In re Lacy, 353 B.R. 264, 280 (D. Colo. 2006) (referring California-licensed attorney to
California bar and Committee on Conduct for the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado based on
determination that counsel’s conduct may violate Colorado professional conduct rules).
116. See generally Jason Mehta, The Development of Federal Professional Responsibility Rules: The Effect
of Institutional Choice on Rule Outcomes, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 57, 69–70 (2007) (describing a
federal court’s inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and authority under the Rules Enabling Act to
adopt rules governing attorney conduct).
117. See Schaefer, Federal Chart, supra note 106. Many of these rules describe to whom a report should be
made (often the Chief Judge), the process for investigating the attorney’s conduct, and the procedures for a
hearing on the charge. See, e.g., M.D. GA. LOC. R. 83.2.3 (describing referral of disciplinary matters to the
Grievance Committee for investigation and the procedure if the committee determines probable cause exists).
Other rules in this category specifically permit the judge presiding in the pending matter to address the
misconduct for purposes of imposing discipline. See, e.g., C.D. CAL. LOC. R. 83-3.1.
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small number of federal district courts have adopted no disciplinary system by
local rule.118 Further, each state’s highest court authorizes a body to investigate
complaints against attorneys, determine if disciplinary charges are warranted,
and if so, file and prosecute disciplinary charges.119 State disciplinary authorities
may discipline for conduct that occurs in federal court.120 Regardless of which
disciplinary authority first disciplines the attorney, reciprocal discipline is likely
to occur in any other licensing jurisdictions or courts in which the attorney is
admitted to practice.121
Discipline possibilities generally include private reprimand or censure, public
reprimand or censure, suspension, and disbarment.122 Diversion is also a
possibility if permitted under court rules. Through a diversion agreement, an
attorney may be able to avoid discipline by participating in an educational
program intended to teach the attorney how to avoid the misconduct in the
future.123

III. THE (APPARENTLY) RARE USE OF THE DISCIPLINE SYSTEM TO ADDRESS
DISCOVERY MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL COURT
There are some limitations on the ability to know the full extent of disciplinary
referrals and discipline decisions.124 Disciplinary complaints and referrals to
disciplinary authorities can be made confidentially.125 Further, a decision
imposing—or declining to impose—discipline does not necessarily result in a

118. The following courts have not adopted local rules to create an internal disciplinary process: District of
Alaska, Eastern District of Arkansas, Southern District of Indiana, District of Massachusetts, Western District
of North Carolina, District of Vermont, Northern and Southern Districts of West Virginia, and Eastern District of
Wisconsin. Schaefer, Federal Chart, supra note 106.
119. See, e.g., TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9, § 4.5 (conferring to the Board of Professional Responsibility the power to
investigate alleged grounds for attorney discipline and to adopt procedures for and monitor investigations and
formal proceedings by Disciplinary Counsel and hearing panels conducted pursuant to the Rule). See generally
Debra Moss Curtis, Attorney Discipline Nationwide: A Comparative Analysis of Process and Statistics, 35 J.
LEGAL PROF. 209, 210 (2011) (explaining that state supreme courts adopt professional conduct rules and create
and administer an enforcement process).
120. MODEL RULES R. 8.5(a).
121. See MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 22 (2002).
122. See, e.g., TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9, § 12 (listing types of discipline); E.D. TENN. LOC. R. 83.7 (listing possible
discipline as disbarment, suspension, reprimand, or other “appropriate and just” discipline).
123. See, e.g., D. MD. LOC. R. 705(1)(h) (describing possible conditions of a diversion agreement).
124. See generally Michael S. Frisch, Web Access to Bar Discipline Information: The Critical Component of
Transparency, LEGAL PROF. BLOG (June 26, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legal_profession/2016/06/
the-web-page-of-the-colorado-supreme-court-was-recently-redesigned-as-noted-below-by-james-c-coyleattorney-regulation-cou.html [http://perma.cc/QX62-5RKN].
125. See, e.g., Comm. on the Conduct of Att’ys v. Oliver, 510 F.3d 1219, 1221–25 (10th Cir. 2007)
(disciplinary proceedings were initiated when U.S. district court judge issued a sealed complaint referring
attorney to Utah State Bar Office of Professional Conduct and District of Utah Disciplinary Panel).
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reported decision.126 This makes it difficult to know the full extent of disciplinary
proceedings related to discovery misconduct.
That being said, the evidence suggests that discipline referrals and the
imposition of discipline for document discovery misconduct that occurred in
federal court are exceedingly rare.127
Though discipline referrals can be made confidentially, one might reasonably
expect a judge planning to make such a referral to signal this in an order
addressing the underlying discovery misconduct.128 In federal court orders
available through Westlaw, there are very few referrals to disciplinary authorities129 or show cause orders130 arising out of attorney document discovery
misconduct. There are a handful of additional document discovery cases in which
judges discuss the applicable professional conduct rules without referencing the
possibility of a referral for discipline.131

126. One reason is that disciplinary matters are sometimes treated as confidential unless the case results in
public discipline. See, e.g., M.D. GA. LOC. R. 83.2.3 (describing confidentiality of disciplinary records “unless
and until otherwise ordered by the Court”). In state disciplinary proceedings, discipline may not result in a
reported decision unless one of the parties appeals. The decision imposing discipline may be difficult to find
through a disciplinary authority’s website. See supra note 124.
127. Westlaw’s advanced search feature was used to retrieve cases in all federal and state courts that included
the terms “discovery” and “3.4” (the professional conduct rule most likely to be violated in every jurisdiction
other than California courts). In an effort to identify California cases involving referrals or discipline and
violations of California Rule of Professional Conduct 5-220 (concerning suppressing evidence), searches
included the terms “discovery” and “5-220.” In searching for state cases that originated in federal court, search
terms also included “U.S. or federal.” These searches retrieved hundreds of decisions that were manually
reviewed to determine whether they involved discipline-related matters and discovery misconduct; the vast
majority did not.
128. Judith A. McMorrow et al., Judicial Attitudes Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View From
the Reported Decisions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1425, 1438 (2004) (asserting that forwarding an opinion to
disciplinary authorities appears to be the most common method of public referral, but noting that a court’s
discipline referral need not occur in a reported decision).
129. Steward v. Steward, 529 B.R. 903, 913–14 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (referring, by the bankruptcy court,
attorneys to state and federal court disciplinary authorities for a variety of misconduct, including failing to
produce discovery documents in violation of court order); Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B
(BLM), 2008 WL 66932, at *18 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008) (sanctioning attorneys for document discovery
misconduct by referring them to the California State Bar for discipline and requiring them to attend a program to
determine failures in the case management and discovery protocols in the case), vacated in part, No.
05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008) (sanctioning attorneys’ portion of
order vacated to allow attorneys to introduce attorney-client privileged communications in their defense),
appeal dismissed, No. 05cv1958–B (BLM), 2010 WL 1336937, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2010) (declining to
impose sanctions against attorneys).
130. In re Marshall, No. 3:15-MC-88-JWD, 2016 WL 81484, at *1 (M.D. La. Jan. 6, 2016) (ordering
attorney to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for violating court rules and Louisiana Rules of
Professional Conduct); In re Gluck, 114 F. Supp. 3d 57, 58 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (issuing, by district court’s
Committee on Grievances, two orders to show cause why attorney should not be disciplined for misconduct in
multiple federal cases).
131. See, e.g., Witt v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 307 F.R.D. 554, 556 & n.2 (D. Colo. 2014); 1100 W., LLC v.
Red Spot Paint & Varnish Co., No. 1:05-cv-1670-LJM-JMS, 2009 WL 1605118, at *28 (S.D. Ind. June 5, 2009);
Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 362–63, 362 n.6 (D. Md. 2008); White v. Office of the
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Ultimately, there are very few federal court decisions addressing the imposition of discipline for discovery misconduct. When the issue of document
discovery misconduct has been considered, it most often arises in the context of
an attorney’s numerous professional conduct violations, with document discovery misconduct receiving only cursory attention in the court’s decision.132 It
appears there are only two federal disciplinary cases that include any extended
discussion of attorneys’ misconduct related to document discovery.133
Similarly, only a small number of state court decisions have addressed attorney
discipline for document discovery misconduct that occurred in federal court.
These cases contain a brief discussion of how attorneys failed to respond to
discovery requests or comply with discovery orders in a federal case, often in the
context of multiple other rule violations.134 One state court decision involves
discipline for failure to produce documents in a federal case in which the
attorneys were defendants and not counsel.135

Pub. Def., 170 F.R.D. 138, 147 (D. Md. 1997); Sanders v. Toyo Umpanki Co., Civ. A. No. 7:92–2402–3, 1994
WL 902775, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 1, 1994).
132. See, e.g., Comm. on the Conduct of Att’ys v. Oliver, 510 F.3d 1219, 1221–25 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming
District of Nevada’s one-year suspension, three-year probation, and public reprimand of attorney for
misconduct in twenty-seven cases, including not responding to discovery requests); In re Marshall, 2016 WL
81484, at *1, *8 (suspending attorney and ordering completion of six hours of ethics continuing legal education
for misconduct in two cases, including document discovery misconduct); Steward, 529 B.R. at 913 (referring
attorneys to state and federal court disciplinary authorities, bankruptcy judge also relies upon inherent power to
suspend attorneys for making false statements, including statements related to discovery); In re Gluck, 114 F.
Supp. 3d at 59–61 (reprimanding publicly the attorney for misconduct in eleven cases, including failing to
comply with court orders, including discovery related orders).
133. The cases are related. The attorneys were a partner and associate who did not produce responsive
documents on a key issue—employment of their client—during discovery. Both were suspended for one year. In
re Gilly, 976 F. Supp. 2d 471, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); In re Filosa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 460, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
134. Bd. of Prof’l Resp. v. Richard, 335 P.3d 1036, 1041–45, 1055 (Wyo. 2014) (addressing discovery
misconduct in multiple cases, including federal case in which the attorney failed to produce responsive
documents); In re Arbuckle, 156 P.3d 668, 669–70 (Kan. 2007) (attorney was referred to disciplinary authorities
by his own client after the client’s case was dismissed by federal court, in part for attorney’s failure to comply
with order compelling discovery responses); In re Devkota, 123 P.3d 1289, 1289–93 (Kan. 2005) (censuring
attorney for, among other things, failing to timely respond to requests for production in federal court); In re
McFarland, 600 S.E.2d 537, 537–40 (S.C. 2004) (reprimanding publicly attorney for misconduct that included
failure to comply with a federal court’s order regarding discovery); Ligon v. Price, 200 S.W.3d 417, 424–26
(Ark. 2004) (attorney did not respond to requests for production or subsequent order compelling production of
documents in federal court by attorney); In re Boone, 7 P.3d 270, 282–83 (Kan. 2000) (disciplining the attorney
for conduct in multiple federal and state court cases, including violations of RPC 3.4 related to document
discovery).
135. In re Carey, 89 S.W.2d 477, 499–504 (Mo. 2002).
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IV. BARRIERS TO ATTORNEYS AND JUDGES REPORTING COUNSEL’S
DISCOVERY MISCONDUCT TO DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITIES
One explanation for the lack of discipline for discovery misconduct in federal
court is that it is not being reported to disciplinary authorities.136 While clients
are most likely to complain about an attorney’s lack of communication or
incompetence,137 discovery misconduct is different. Because it harms opposing
parties and the court system, the most likely reporters are opposing counsel and
judges. The following discussion considers these groups separately to understand
why they may be disinclined to report discovery misconduct to disciplinary
authorities.
A. EXPLANATIONS FOR ATTORNEYS UNDERREPORTING MISCONDUCT BY
OPPOSING COUNSEL

Jurisdictions with a professional conduct rule based on Model Rule 8.3 require
an attorney who “knows” of another lawyer’s violation of professional conduct
rules to report that violation to appropriate authorities if the rule violation “raises
a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer.”138 A report is not required if it would violate the confidentiality rule
(Rule 1.6),139 but client consent to reporting opposing counsel’s conduct
alleviates any confidentiality concerns.140
Despite the mandatory reporting duty if the rule’s standard is met, the standard
is flexible enough that a lawyer disinclined to report can justify that decision.141
A lawyer may reason that he does not necessarily “know” that opposing counsel
violated a professional conduct rule, or she may rationalize a decision not to
report because the conduct, though a rule violation, does not raise a substantial
question of honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness.142 Further, the confidentiality
exception allows attorneys the leeway to avoid reporting by not seeking client

136. Arthur Greenbaum, Judicial Reporting of Lawyer Misconduct, 77 UMKC L. REV. 537, 539–40 (2009)
(“[C]onventional wisdom suggests that [a judge’s duty to report lawyer misconduct] is still a duty that is largely
ignored.”).
137. The most common complaints to disciplinary authorities and the most common basis for discipline is
that a lawyer harmed his or her own client. Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and
Promise of Restorative Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 259 (2012).
138. MODEL RULES R. 8.3(a).
139. MODEL RULES R. 8.3(c).
140. MODEL RULES R. 1.6(a).
141. Nikki A. Ott & Heather F. Newton, A Current Look at Model Rule 8.3: How Is It Used and What Are
Courts Doing About It?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 747, 749–54 (2003) (describing the many reasons lawyers are
reluctant to report professional misconduct of “one of their own”).
142. Id. at 751–52 (describing discovery misconduct as an example of a scenario that lawyers may view as
not clearly raising a “substantial” question of lawyer honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness).
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consent.143 Because of the flexibility of the standard for mandatory reporting,
attorneys know that discipline for their violation of Rule 8.3 is unlikely.144 And
when discipline is unlikely for failure to take action that lawyers are reluctant to
take, there is little incentive to act.145
There is reason to believe that lawyers are, indeed, reluctant to report
professional misconduct.146 One frequently cited reason lawyers are disinclined
to report is that they do not want to be perceived as snitches.147 Lawyers fear
reporting misconduct will hurt their professional reputation with other lawyers.148 They may also be reluctant to report misconduct because they identify
with the conduct of their opposing counsel. Perhaps lawyers are willing to seek
sanctions but not discipline149 because they view the two differently; sanctions
do not necessarily target opposing counsel150 and are more often awarded against
the opposing party than opposing counsel.151
Further, there are some practical explanations for the lack of reporting.
Uncompensated time and effort is required to file a disciplinary complaint against
another lawyer.152 And lawyers may believe that if the misconduct truly justifies a
referral for discipline, the judge—who has the same knowledge of the miscon-

143. Because all information “related to the representation of the client” is covered by the confidentiality
obligation, it is irrelevant that the information about opposing counsel’s discovery misconduct is not privileged;
it still must be kept in confidence. See MODEL RULES R. 1.6(a).
144. Ott & Newton, supra note 141, at 755 (noting the scarcity of discipline against attorneys for failing to
report another lawyer’s professional misconduct).
145. Conversely, when discipline is foreseeable for a failure to report, attorneys are more likely to take action
under RPC 8.3. See Seth Ellis & Jeffrey R. Hanes, The 20 Year Anniversary of Himmel: Brushing Up on Your
Duty to Report Attorney Misconduct, DCBA BRIEF, March 2009, at 16, 16 (explaining that in the year after the
Illinois Supreme Court suspended attorney James Himmel for failing to report attorney misconduct under RPC
8.3, reports of attorney misconduct increased from 154 cases to 922 cases).
146. See R. Sadler Bailey, Using the Rules of Ethics to Move Your Case to Trial, 2 ATLA ANN. CONVENTION
1353, at *4 (2006) (noting that most attorneys do not use ethics rules to combat discovery abuse); John Freeman,
If It’s Broke, Fix It, S.C. LAW., Jan./Feb. 1994, at 6 (describing “abusive discovery” as a pervasive problem that
could be addressed by Rule 3.4, but “the issue is whether lawyers have the will to use it”).
147. A. Rebecca Williams, Current Development, An Inside Job: Using In-Court Sting Operations to
Uncover Corruption in an Inadequate Self-Regulating System, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 969, 977 (2015)
(describing how “anti-snitching culture” contributes to lawyers under-reporting misconduct); Michael
J. Burwick, Note, You Dirty Rat!! Model Rule 8.3 and Mandatory Reporting of Attorney Misconduct, 8 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 137, 143 (1994) (noting a commentator’s description of a reporting rule as a “snitch” rule); Ott &
Newton, supra note 141, at 753 (describing lawyer fear that reporting professional misconduct will result in
being “labeled a snitch” and could impact the reporting lawyer’s reputation).
148. Id.
149. Bailey, supra note 146, at *4 (asserting that in response to discovery misconduct, it is common to file a
motion to compel and seek sanctions, but not to report to disciplinary authorities).
150. Monetary sanctions available under the FRCP can be entered against a party, a lawyer, or both. FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(g), 37(a)(5)(A), 37(a)(5)(B), 37(b)(2)(C).
151. Willoughby et al., supra note 3, at 815–18 (detailing empirical evidence that clients are sanctioned for
discovery misconduct more often than lawyers, and when lawyers are sanctioned, clients are typically
sanctioned as well).
152. Ott & Newton, supra note 141, at 754 (explaining that the effort required to report lawyer misconduct
acts as a disincentive to reporting).
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duct and will not be perceived as having an “ax to grind” with opposing
counsel—is in a better position to make the referral.153 Finally, attorneys may
perceive that their complaints against opposing counsel would be taken less
seriously than that of a client harmed by his or her own attorney.154 There is
reason to believe lawyers may be correct in this belief.
B. EXPLANATIONS FOR JUDGES UNDERREPORTING ATTORNEY
DISCOVERY MISCONDUCT

Under the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges, a judge “should” take “appropriate action” when the judge has “reliable evidence indicating the likelihood” that a
lawyer violated professional conduct rules.155 Commentary to the rule explains
that “appropriate action” may include “direct communication” with the lawyer,
“other direct action,” “reporting the conduct to the appropriate authorities,” or in
the case of substance abuse, referring the lawyer to a lawyer’s assistance
program.156
Based on the variety of “appropriate actions” that may be taken under the Code
of Conduct, federal judges may believe that pointing out a lawyer’s discovery
misconduct is sufficient.157 Even in the case of egregious misconduct, a judge
may believe that sanctioning an attorney is more efficient than instigating a
satellite proceeding,158 thus making a discipline referral unnecessary.159 Finally,
the judge may be disinclined to make a discipline referral because—perhaps
based on the judge’s own practice experience—the judge identifies with the
attorney160 and does not want to harm the attorney’s reputation.161
153. Greenbaum, supra note 136, at 550 (asserting that if disciplinary authorities give more deference to
judges’ reports of misconduct it is probably justified because the judge “rightly has more credibility than . . . a
lawyer adversary” and “the judge is less likely to have an ‘ax to grind’ with the reported lawyer”).
154. Brown & Wolf, supra note 137, at 262 (noting that a third party who files a disciplinary complaint does
not “suffer the breach of trust and loss of relationship that a former client does”).
155. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES, Canon 3(B)(5).
156. Id. at Commentary.
157. McMorrow et al., supra note 128, at 1432 (explaining that “appropriate action” is “so open-ended as to
offer no meaningful guidance to judges”).
158. Id. at 1427–28 (asserting that efficiency concerns are likely a dominant factor in how judges address
attorney misconduct in litigation); Michael S. McGinniss, Sending the Message: Using Technology to Support
Judicial Reporting of Lawyer Misconduct to State Disciplinary Agencies, J. PROF. LAW., 2013, at 37, 52 (noting
efficiency concerns as a reason for underreporting); see also CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES, Canon
3(B)(5), Commentary (noting that communicating with the lawyer and “other direct action” are appropriate
responses to attorney misconduct).
159. See, e.g., GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., 248 F.R.D. 182, 198 n.23 (E.D. Penn. 2008) (“The Court will
refrain from referring this matter to a disciplinary authority in this case . . . because the sanctions imposed
pursuant to the [FRCP] are sufficient to achieve the remedial purpose of the Rules of Professional Conduct.”).
160. See Mehta, supra note 116, at 95 (asserting that judges will approach issues of attorney conduct
rulemaking “with some sort of bias towards their particular experience in the law”). See generally BENJAMIN H.
BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011).
161. See McMorrow et al., supra note 128, at 1428 (explaining judges’ motivation to protect attorneys’
reputations when addressing attorney misconduct). Judges are reluctant to impose discovery sanctions for the
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V. THE CASE FOR APPROPRIATE, CONSISTENT USE OF THE DISCIPLINE
SYSTEM TO ADDRESS DOCUMENT DISCOVERY MISCONDUCT
Refereeing a constant stream of discovery disputes—many involving attorney
conduct in violation of professional conduct rules—places a tremendous strain on
judicial resources. If the same judges were to appropriately and consistently use
the attorney discipline system, attorneys would likely get the message and
change. This Part explains when discipline is appropriate, how judges can use the
discipline system consistently to effect change, and why discipline may be more
effective than sanctions alone.
A. APPROPRIATE USE OF THE DISCIPLINE SYSTEM: WHICH DISCOVERY
CONDUCT SHOULD (AND SHOULD NOT) RESULT IN DISCIPLINE?

Not all discovery disputes involve attorney misconduct.162 As long as an
attorney is transparent with opposing counsel and the court about an arguably
legitimate basis for requesting documents or objecting to an opponent’s requests,
then professional discipline generally is not appropriate. Regarding the requesting attorney, RPC 3.4(d) permits discipline only for making a “frivolous”
discovery request.163 Even a request that is found to be beyond the scope of
discovery (based on the court’s determination that the request is not proportionate, for example) typically does not rise to the level of “frivolous.”164 As to the
objecting party, knowingly disobeying an obligation under court rules (such as
the obligation to produce documents) is misconduct, “except for an open refusal
based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.”165 In the transparent
objection scenario, the attorney’s conduct is an open refusal falling within the
exception to the professional conduct rule.166 It is good policy not to discipline an
attorney who transparently makes even wrong-headed objections because it

same reasons. See, e.g., Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, IA v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936, 944 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing
In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Actions, 278 F.3d 175, 191 (3d Cir. 2002)) (noting the
“tangible effect” sanctions can have on an attorney’s career).
162. Undoubtedly, discovery disputes add to the cost of litigation and to the frustration of the parties and the
court. Many of these disputes could be avoided if opposing counsel could cooperate to resolve their disputes.
But discipline is not a tool for reining in legitimate, though costly, discovery disputes.
163. MODEL RULES R. 3.4(d).
164. Under the FRCP, a document request is arguably improper if it seeks documents beyond the scope of
discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), 34. But there is no way to test what is beyond the scope of discovery
without making the request and (if agreement cannot be reached) seeking the court’s input through a motion to
compel. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
165. MODEL RULES R. 3.4(c).
166. See, e.g., DiSante v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys. Inc., Nos. 89-1931, 89-1968, 1991 WL 37827, at *5
(6th Cir. Mar. 19, 1991) (disagreeing with the district court’s suggestion that a party who objected to discovery
requests violated professional conduct rules, explaining that “defendant chose to resist vigorously plaintiffs’
request for document production . . . . Yet there is nothing to suggest that defendant’s strategy decision was
without any legal or factual basis . . . .”).
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encourages openness in articulating objections, which helps resolve disputes
more efficiently.
Discovery conduct that should be disciplined generally falls into one of two
categories: (1) misleading an opposing party and (2) intentionally or negligently
failing to perform a duty owed to an opposing party.
A lack of transparency in objections falls into the first category. An attorney’s
non-specific, boilerplate objections—such that an opposing party will not know
whether documents were withheld on the basis of the objections—should result
in discipline.167 The FRCP requires such transparency so that a requesting party
can challenge the objection and seek production of the document.168 But no
meaningful challenge can be made if every request is met with boilerplate
objections and ambiguous statements about whether any documents were
withheld. This conduct is pervasive, frustrates the discovery process, and violates
all of the discovery-related provisions of RPC 3.4.169
In the second category of misconduct appropriate for discipline, an attorney’s
intentional or negligent failure to identify and timely produce responsive
documents should result in a discipline referral.170 Each of the discovery-related
provisions of RPC 3.4 prohibits this conduct.171 If there is any doubt that even
negligent failure to identify and produce responsive documents should result in
discipline, RPC 3.4(d) explicitly states that it is misconduct for an attorney to
“fail to make [a] reasonably diligent effort to comply” with a proper discovery
request.172
Also in the second category, an attorney’s negligent or intentional role in
spoliation of evidence is another appropriate basis for discipline.173 Attorneys are
in a better position than clients to understand the steps that must be taken to fulfill
the common law duty of preservation. Rule 3.4 provides that it is misconduct for
an attorney to “unlawfully obstruct[]” a party’s access to evidence or to
“unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document . . . having potential evidentiary
value.”174
A final type of misconduct in the second category is an attorney’s violation of a
discovery-related court order.175 Such an order likely will be a scheduling order

167. See supra notes 67–75 and accompanying text.
168. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B)–(C) (requiring specificity in objections and statement of whether material is
withheld based on objections), 37(a)(3)(B) (motion to compel discovery response).
169. MODEL RULES R. 3.4(a) (shall not unlawfully obstruct access to evidence or conceal a document), 3.4(c)
(shall not knowingly disobey court rules, except for an open refusal), 3.4(d) (shall not fail to make a reasonably
diligent effort to comply with a proper request for discovery).
170. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 169.
172. MODEL RULES R. 3.4(d).
173. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
174. MODEL RULES R. 3.4(a).
175. See generally supra note 93 and accompanying text (regarding sanctions for violating court order).
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(that details the parties’ obligations in discovery)176 or an order compelling the
production of documents (following a prior discovery dispute).177 In either of
those scenarios, the obligation arises out of court rules as applied to the facts of
the case.178 Thus, such a violation would likely also be a violation of RPC
3.4(c).179
Discipline is critical in this second category. In the context of producing
documents, preserving evidence, and complying with court orders, the opposing
party has no choice but to rely upon the competence and diligence of opposing
counsel.180 While a client can sue a lawyer for professional negligence for
violating the duty of care,181 an opposing party generally cannot.182 Sanctions for
violating the rules of discovery have not been an adequate deterrent to violating
this obligation.183 And the new FRCP provision governing spoliation of
electronic evidence does not even address attorney sanctions.184 Because the law
cannot and has not deterred attorneys from violating a duty of competence owed
to opposing parties in discovery, discipline should step in to play that role.
Some may be concerned that discipline for discovery misconduct could cause
some attorneys to be overly cautious in their advocacy, to the detriment of their
clients. But zealous advocacy involves making the best argument for the client’s
position, letting an opponent do the same, and if the parties cannot reach a
resolution, allowing the dispute to be decided by the judge.185 Making discipline
referrals in the scenarios described in this section (a lack of transparency in

176. See, e.g., Sun River Energy, Inc. v. Nelson, 800 F.3d 1219, 1228–30 (10th Cir. 2015) (affirming sanction
against attorney for violating discovery obligation in scheduling order); Mahoney v. Yamaha Motor Corp.
U.S.A., 290 F.R.D. 363, 368–69 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (imposing sanctions against attorney for violating discovery
obligations in scheduling and pretrial orders).
177. See, e.g., In re Steward, 529 B.R. 903, 909–10 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (attorney ignored court order
compelling production of discovery); Porter Bridge Loan Co. v. Hentges, No. 09-CV-593-JED-FHM, 2013 WL
1412372, at *5 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 8, 2013) (describing the “extraordinary delay and expense” necessitated by
party failing to comply with court’s prior order compelling discovery responses); Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc.,
239 F.R.D. 81, 94 (D.N.J. 2006) (attorneys violated judge’s order compelling discovery).
178. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb. v. BASF Corp., No. 4:04CV3356, 2007 WL 3342423, at *5 (D.
Neb. Nov. 5, 2007) (explaining the relationship between counsel’s failure to take affirmative steps to ensure
production of documents in compliance with court order and counsel’s failure to meet obligations under the
FRCP).
179. See MODEL RULES R. 3.4(c).
180. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
181. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 48 (2000) (describing a cause of action for
professional negligence for lawyer’s failure to exercise care—namely, the “competence and diligence normally
exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances”).
182. The Restatement describes the limited circumstances in which a lawyer has liability to non-clients for
breaching the duty of care. Lawyer conduct in discovery is not among the circumstances described as a basis for
liability to a non-client. See id. § 51.
183. See generally supra Part I (describing the current state of attorney misconduct in conducting document
discovery in federal court).
184. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
185. Paula Schaefer, Harming Business Clients with Zealous Advocacy: Rethinking the Attorney Advisor’s
Touchstone, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 262 (2011).
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objections, a failure to search for and produce requested documents, a failure to
competently address preservation of evidence, and non-compliance with discovery orders) facilitates zealous advocacy because it allows both parties to know
and address the evidence in the case.186 Attorneys engaged in such misconduct
are not being advocates in a dispute.187 They are playing a part in hiding or
withholding documents or misleading their opponents. Such conduct has never
been recognized as appropriate advocacy.188
B. CONSISTENCY AND BEHAVIORAL LEGAL ETHICS

In the current discovery environment, there are various reasons attorneys may
not comply with the discovery rules. At one end of the spectrum, some attorneys
may not know the rules. At the other extreme, attorneys may intentionally violate
the rules, perhaps based on a rational decision that the benefits outweigh the
costs.189
Consistency on two discipline-related fronts could impact both of these
explanations for discovery misconduct. Judges should consistently (1) educate
attorneys about discovery ethics expectations, including telling attorneys the
disciplinary consequences of violating the rules, and (2) impose consequences—in the nature of disciplinary referrals and ultimately discipline—when
attorneys violate those obligations. For attorneys ignorant of their professional
duties in discovery, the education piece should direct them toward appropriate
conduct. For attorneys making a calculated decision to engage in misconduct,
consistent adverse consequences could give them the incentive they need to
change their ways—or punishment if they will not change.
In between the two extremes are attorneys who understand their discovery
obligations and have good intentions but nonetheless engage in misconduct.
Behavioral legal ethics—the study of how behavioral science impacts attorney

186. As U.S. Magistrate Judge Grimm explains in Mancia v. Mayflower, “[T]here is nothing inherent in [the
adversary system] that precludes cooperation between the parties and their attorneys during the litigation
process to achieve orderly and cost effective discovery of the competing facts on which the [adversary] system
depends.” Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 361 (D. Md. 2008) (emphasis added); see
also 1100 W., LLC v. Red Spot Paint & Varnish Co., No. 1:05-cv-1670-LJM-JMS, 2009 WL 1605118, at *33
(S.D. Ind. June 5, 2009) (explaining that defendant’s attorneys should have made a complete disclosure in
discovery “so that the lawyers could argue and a fact finder could determine the merits of the case”) (emphasis
added).
187. See, e.g., 1100 W., 2009 WL 1605118, at *34 (in sanctioning law firm for failure to produce responsive
documents, court noted, “Being a zealous lawyer does not mean zealously believing your client in light of
evidence to the contrary”).
188. MODEL RULES R. 3.4 cmt. 1 (“Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions
against destruction or concealment of evidence, . . . obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like.”).
189. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 739 (2003)
(asserting that not enforcing professional conduct rules may encourage lawyers’ non-compliance with those
rules) [hereinafter Zacharias, Purposes].
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conduct—can provide insight into this attorney behavior.190 A cognitive bias or
mindset of zealous advocacy can shade how attorneys view the appropriateness
of their conduct in discovery.191 For example, a document that an objective third
party would see as responsive to a document request may be viewed as
non-responsive through the partisan eyes of the zealous advocate.192 Further, this
bias may cause lawyers to rationalize their more questionable discovery conduct
(from boilerplate objections to delayed document productions) as what is
expected of a zealous advocate (rather than the violation of law and ethics rules
that it actually is).193 The zealous advocacy mindset can contribute to “ethical
fading”—becoming so acculturated to certain practices that the ethical component fades out of consideration, making unethical decisions easier.194 A lawyer’s
personal interests (like the desire to please a client)195 or situational pressures
(such as to act in conformity with the conduct of other firm lawyers)196 can
contribute to the ways that lawyers interpret and resolve ethical dilemmas in
discovery.
Judges can counteract these factors—and perhaps even harness the power of
behavioral science—by consistently educating attorneys about discovery expec-

190. See, e.g., Tigran W. Eldred, Insights from Psychology: Teaching Behavioral Legal Ethics as a Core
Element of Professional Responsibility, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 757, 759 (explaining that the central idea of
behavioral legal ethics is that “unethical conduct is frequently the product of psychological factors that occur
largely outside of the conscious awareness of the decision-maker”); Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral Theory
of Legal Ethics, 90 IND. L.J. 1639, 1640 (2015) (asserting that situational factors, like the lawyer’s partisan role,
can result in unethical conduct); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1107, 1111–12 (2013) (explaining insights that can be gained from psychology concerning why
attorneys behave unethically).
191. See Perlman, supra note 190, at 1651 (making the case that partisanship research supports the
conclusion that people in a partisan role have difficulty assessing information objectively); Cassandra Burke
Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1, 40 (2009) (asserting that when attorneys
are “motivated to zealously represent their clients, a partisan bias may shade and distort their advice”);
Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 190, at 1137–38 (explaining that an adversarial mindset can cause lawyers
to take zealousness too far).
192. See Perlman, supra note 190, at 1655–56 (discussing research study in which auditors’ determination of
whether financial reports were GAAP-compliant was heavily influenced by the partisan role the auditors were
asked to play as either retained by the company or by an outside investor and asserting that “lawyers may be
particularly vulnerable to this distortion given their institutional function”).
193. See generally Perlman, supra note 190, at 1641 (“The research on partisanship strongly implies that
lawyers who adopt this view will have difficulty identifying the line between permissible and impermissible
advocacy . . . .”).
194. Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 190, at 1120–21 (arguing that “ethical fading” explains how
lawyers frequently respond to a discussion of ethics: they do not think much about ethics, do not see issues in
ethical terms, and they “appear to be so acculturated to certain practices they did not consider the ethical issues
implicated by those practices”).
195. Id. at 1129; Perlman, supra note 190, at 1657 (describing the strong incentive for lawyers to please
clients, making it harder to resist “the distorting effects of partisanship”).
196. See Eldred, supra note 190, at 765 (explaining situationism as the “general notion that the subtle aspects
of a situation often play” a role in decision making, such as the power of a group to exert pressure on an
individual to conform or an authority figure to command obedience).
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tations and imposing disciplinary consequences for discovery misconduct.197
Ethical conduct is more likely when those ethics issues are in the forefront of
attorneys’ thought processes.198 Judges can make these issues salient by raising
the issue of discovery ethics in conferences with attorneys and reinforcing those
conversations by putting expectations in writing (such as a scheduling order).199
Further, the real, imminent prospect of discipline would impact a lawyer’s
personal interests, thus influencing how the lawyer interprets information and
makes decisions about discovery conduct.200 It may only take the imposition of
discipline in a case or two in the judge’s court for the word to spread and
attorneys to adjust their conduct.201 Finally, the judge’s role as an authority figure
and the pressure of obedience could also influence attorney decision making in
this context.202
C. ADVANTAGES OF DISCIPLINE OVER SANCTIONS ALONE

Some might opine that sanctions could be used in this same way (consistently
and appropriately) to deter discovery misconduct. People in this camp might
argue that if a judge or an entire court were to develop a reputation for
sanctioning discovery misconduct, this too could deter misconduct and result in a
more efficient discovery process.203 Sanctions-only proponents would note that
the advantage of using sanctions over discipline is efficiency: the judge presiding
over the matter can address the issue without the need to refer the matter to the

197. This focus on the judge’s influence is a different perspective from that offered in other behavioral legal
ethics literature, which has considered what lawyers, law firms, and rule makers might do to address cognitive
biases. See, e.g., Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 190, at 1156–81 (describing steps that attorneys and legal
employers should take to address unconscious and unintentional attorney misconduct); Perlman, supra note
190, at 1662–67 (describing how lawyers should utilize debiasing techniques and approaches that lawmakers
and regulators might take to lessen the risk of biased decision making).
198. See Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 190, at 1158–59 (suggesting tools lawyers can use to make
ethics salient).
199. See infra Part VI.A.
200. See Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 190, at 1129.
201. See, e.g., Ellis & Hanes, supra note 145, at 16 (reporting a 600% increase in attorney reports of
misconduct in the year following one attorney being disciplined for his failure to report misconduct as required
by Illinois RPC 8.3).
202. See Eldred, supra note 190, at 765–66 (citing Catherine Gage O’Grady, Wrongful Obedience and the
Professional Practice of Law, 19 J.L. BUS & ETHICS 9 (2013) and Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience by
Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from Social Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 451 (2007) (noting social
psychology research on the power of an authority figure to command obedience)).
203. See generally Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (discovery
sanctions are intended to deter misconduct); Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Day, 800 F.3d 936, 942 (8th Cir.
2015) (asserting that discovery misconduct would be deterred if more attorneys would seek and more judges
would impose discovery sanctions); Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 360 (D. Md.
2008) (asserting that judges are expected to impose sanctions for counsel’s violation of FRCP 26(g) in order to
“punish and deter” discovery misconduct); see also Zacharias, Nobody’s Watching, supra note 113, at 1003
(considering the availability of other remedies as a reason for not enforcing professional conduct rules).
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court’s disciplinary process (or a state disciplinary body) for a satellite
proceeding.
As a threshold matter, discipline does not necessarily have to occur in a
satellite proceeding. When not prohibited by local rules,204 a court could rely
upon inherent authority to impose discipline in the context of a pending case.205
The judge would need to provide due process protections to the attorney206 and
undertake the same analysis concerning appropriate discipline as a judge
presiding over a disciplinary proceeding.207
Nonetheless, even if the norm is a separate disciplinary proceeding—with
increased cost and lost efficiency—discipline should not be dismissed out of
hand. There are a number of potential advantages to discipline over sanctions
alone that are worth considering as courts wrestle with how to address discovery
misconduct.
Disciplining attorneys for their discovery misconduct may encourage attorneys to lead rather than follow their clients through discovery.208 When
sanctions—often only assessed against the client209—are the only penalty of
discovery abuse, lawyers may view misconduct as a choice that can be left to the

204. Of course, there are some local rules that explicitly permit the judge to handle discipline in the pending
matter. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
205. See Ryan v. Astra Tech, Inc., 772 F.3d 50, 58–59 (1st Cir. 2014) (determining that District of
Massachusetts’ local disciplinary procedure is an option for handling attorney discipline and not the only
permitted method of imposing discipline); Steward v. Steward, 529 B.R. 903, 918–19 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (finding
that the bankruptcy court properly relied upon its inherent authority in suspending attorneys and was not
required to institute formal disciplinary proceedings under local rules of the court). Not referring a matter in
favor of handling it in the pending case conserves resources, but is likely not appropriate in a case when
additional factual investigation is necessary. See infra notes 246–51 and accompanying text (concerning how
judges should analyze the issue to determine if referral is unnecessary); infra notes 261–64 and accompanying
text (concerning adopting a local rule to give judges guidance about when it is appropriate to handle discipline
in a pending case).
206. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968) (“[An attorney sought to be disbarred] is . . . entitled to
procedural due process, which includes fair notice of the charge.”); Fed. Grievance Comm. v. Williams, 743
F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2014) (describing due process requirements fulfilled in disciplinary proceeding when
attorney received adequate notice of the charges and adequate time to defend himself); In re Tutu Wells
Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 418 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining due process rights that must be provided
when court is considering suspending an attorney as including “notice of the legal rule on which the sanctions
would be based, the reasons for the sanctions, and the form of the potential sanctions”).
207. See infra notes 218–22 and accompanying text.
208. See Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 477 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (“[E]ven if the client directs counsel
to respond to discovery requests in a certain manner, counsel has the ultimate obligation to ensure that the
responses and objections are well grounded in fact and law.”). Many attorneys currently have it backwards,
believing that clients take the lead in discovery. See, e.g., Granados v. Traffic Bar & Rest., Inc., No. 13 Civ. 0500
(TPG) (JCF), 2016 WL 1317988, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016) (attorney argued that sanctions against him
should be set aside because he had zealously represented his clients who had not cooperated in discovery).
209. See Willoughby et al., supra note 3, at 815–18 (detailing empirical evidence that clients are sanctioned
for discovery misconduct more often than lawyers, and when lawyers are sanctioned, clients are typically
sanctioned as well).
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client.210 The real prospect of discipline may help attorneys understand that they,
and not their clients, will pay professional consequences for violating the
discovery rules and related professional conduct rules. If the client refuses to
follow the lawyer’s lead, the lawyer has an easy and required remedy: withdraw
from the representation.211
The prospect of discipline is a powerful incentive because it impacts an
attorney’s license and livelihood.212 Obviously, being suspended or disbarred for
discovery misconduct would prevent the attorney from practicing. But even less
severe forms of discipline have an impact. Public discipline (such as a reprimand)
is revealed when a client or prospective client searches for the attorney’s name in
a state’s online attorney directory. Prior discipline, and even the pendency of
disciplinary proceedings, can prevent an attorney being admitted pro hac vice in
another court.213 Further, because an attorney practicing in a federal court is also
licensed in one or more states,214 an attorney disciplined by a federal court can
expect reciprocal discipline of his or her state-issued license.215
Funneling misconduct to a federal court’s discipline system may help the court
recognize the need for (and then, develop) systemic solutions to common
problems.216 Developing remedial education programs for lawyers who do not
properly conduct discovery could be central to a federal court’s effort to achieve
change. Educating members of the bar who lack an understanding of the law may
be a more efficient way to effect change than through sanctions alone.217

210. Thomas Y. Allman, Conducting E-Discovery After the Amendments: The Second Wave, 10 SEDONA
CONF. J. 215, 218 (2009) (“A mild presumption exists that clients are in the best position to control their counsel
and, absent egregious counsel conduct, should bear the discovery sanctions.”).
211. MODEL RULES R. 1.16(a)(1) (lawyer shall withdraw from the representation if the representation will
result in violation of professional conduct rules); see, e.g., Farmer v. Hyde Your Eyes Optical, Inc., No.
13–CV–6653 (GBD)(JLC), 2015 WL 2250592, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2015) (describing counsel’s motion to
withdraw based on “deterioration of the attorney-client relationship” shortly after client failed to produce
documents he had been ordered to produce).
212. See Freeman, supra note 146 (arguing that discovery abuse happens when the benefits exceed the costs,
but that the possibility of discipline under Rule 3.4(d) offers a “drastic means of limiting discovery
abuse—targeting the offending lawyer’s license”).
213. See, e.g., In re Kugel Mesh Hernia Repair Patch Litig., No. MDL 07-1842ML, 2011 WL 4444066, at *2
(D.R.I. Sept. 6, 2011) (pro hac vice admission can be denied based on “applicant’s qualifications, character, past
conduct and any other factors that bear on the applicant’s fitness to practice in this Court” (citing D.R.I. LOC. R.
204(f)(1))).
214. See, e.g., E.D. TENN. LOC. R. 83.5(a)(1) (to be admitted, attorney must be admitted to practice in the
highest court of a state, territory, or the District of Columbia).
215. See, e.g., TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9, § 25 (Reciprocal Discipline). Likewise, even if discipline for the
misconduct originates in the state discipline system, the attorney is subject to reciprocal discipline in the federal
courts in which he or she practices. See, e.g., E.D. TENN. LOC. R. 83.7(g) (Conformity with State Discipline).
216. See In re Am. Airlines, 972 F.2d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 1992) (asserting that federal district courts are
obligated “to take measures against unethical conduct occurring in connection with any proceeding before
[them]” and that they have an obligation to “clean [their] own house”).
217. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A., 290 F.R.D. 363, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (sanctioning
attorney despite his argument that he should not be sanctioned because he is inexperienced).
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Further, using the court’s internal discipline system can also facilitate fair
consequences for an attorney’s discovery misconduct. While the proper level of
sanctions is largely left to the discretion of the individual judge, imposing
discipline generally requires the disciplinary authority to seek and the judge to
impose uniform punishment for similar violations.218 Thus, absent aggravating or
mitigating factors, an admonition is appropriate for negligent conduct in
discovery resulting in little or no injury to another party219 while suspension
would be appropriate if a lawyer knowingly violates a court rule or order, causing
injury to another party or interference with the proceeding.220 Appropriate
discipline also takes into account prior discipline history.221 Thus, if a court’s
judges make consistent referrals of discovery misconduct, over time, disciplinary
authorities will be able to identify lawyers with a history of discipline for
discovery misconduct and impose more severe discipline.222
Finally, RPC 3.4 represents the values of the legal profession and its
enforcement—or non-enforcement—represents the profession’s commitment to
those values. Rule 3.4 demands that attorneys act competently, openly, and fairly
in the interest of the opposing party in discovery.223 The title of the rule explicitly
references what is at stake: the fair treatment of opposing parties and opposing
counsel.224 When today’s Model Rule 3.4 was proposed by the Kutak Commission in 1982, the bar associations that filed comments opposing the rule argued it
was not consistent with the lawyer’s duty as an advocate and that frivolous
discovery requests and diligent efforts to respond to proper discovery requests
were matters of procedure and not professional conduct.225
The fact that Model Rule 3.4 was adopted over these objections226 and
thereafter adopted by the vast majority of jurisdictions227 indicates that fair play

218. See generally STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS (Am. Bar Ass’n 1992) (approved February
10, 1986, amended February 4, 1992).
219. Id. at Standard 6.24.
220. See id. at Standard 6.22.
221. See id. at Standard 9.22.
222. See id.
223. See MODEL RULES R. 3.4.
224. See MODEL RULES R. 3.4.
225. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
1982–2005, at 463–68 (2006) (the Los Angeles County Bar Association commented that the topics covered in
proposed paragraph (d) “are not matters governed by Rules of Conduct but rather by Rules of Practice”; the
Cuyahoga County Bar Association asserted the effect of the proposed rule “is to destroy advocacy and require[]
the lawyer to practice at his or her peril. The proposed rule totally ignores the dynamics of litigation”; the
Philadelphia Bar Association urged “[t]he proposed paragraph (d) would move sanctions for discovery abuse
from being the responsibility of the trial judge to the disciplinary process”).
226. Most of the objections and proposed amendments were withdrawn and others were defeated when the
ABA adopted the rule as proposed. See id.
227. See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text.
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in discovery is an essential value of the legal profession.228 This rule fits into the
category of professional conduct rules in which the profession has decided
lawyers must put the interests of a third party before the desires of a client.229 It
represents a choice and commitment that lawyers must protect opposing parties
in discovery.230 This is essential to the workings of a litigation process in which a
party must rely upon opposing counsel.231 When federal judges ignore the
professional misconduct aspect of discovery abuse, they miss an opportunity to
uphold the profession’s values.232 This is a mistake. Referring attorneys for
discipline and then imposing discipline for discovery misconduct makes a
powerful statement about the principles of our profession.

VI. DISCIPLINE-FOCUSED REFORMS THAT MAY IMPROVE DISCOVERY
CONDUCT IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES
Ultimately, the attorney discipline system will not deter discovery misconduct
absent change in current practices and rules. Reforms could come about by
educating federal judges about how and why they can use the discipline system to
address discovery misconduct, educating attorneys about discovery conduct
expectations at the outset of a case and again if misconduct occurs, and amending
local rules and judicial conduct rules to address various discipline-related issues.
The following discussion considers how these changes might be accomplished at
three levels: by individual judges, at the court-level, and across the federal
judiciary.
A. JUDGE-LEVEL REFORMS: SCHEDULING CONFERENCES AND ORDERS
AND ADDRESSING MISCONDUCT WHEN IT OCCURS

Meaningful change in attorney discovery conduct could occur in response to
reforms instituted by a single judge. For example, if a U.S. Magistrate Judge who
deals with a high volume of discovery disputes each year were to implement
discipline-focused changes in his or her courtroom, these changes could have a
deterrent effect on misconduct by all attorneys who appear in that courtroom.
This Part focuses on two changes individual judges could institute: (1) using
scheduling conferences and orders to educate lawyers about expectations and

228. See Alex B. Long, Employment Discrimination in the Legal Profession: A Question of Ethics?, 2016 U.
ILL. L. REV. 445, 472 (explaining that a function of professional conduct rules is to disseminate the profession’s
values).
229. See Paula Schaefer, A Primer on Professionalism for Doctrinal Professors, 81 TENN. L. REV. 279,
288–89 (2014).
230. See id. at 288–90.
231. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
232. See generally Zacharias, Purposes, supra note 189, at 739 (asserting that when professional conduct
rule violations are ignored, attorney misconduct is encouraged and the public may lose trust in the disciplinary
system).
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consequences of misconduct, and (2) addressing discovery misconduct when it
happens.
1. SCHEDULING CONFERENCES AND ORDERS

A judge should alert attorneys early in a case of the judge’s practice of making
discipline referrals for discovery misconduct. This is not a due process issue; the
attorneys are already aware that they can be referred for discipline, and they will
have a later opportunity to defend themselves against discipline charges. The
point of alerting attorneys to the possibility of discipline is to remind attorneys of
their professional conduct obligations, and hopefully, to encourage them to
comply with those obligations.233
Judges should consider providing this information to attorneys at a scheduling
conference following the parties’ 26(f) discovery planning conference.234
Thereafter, the same information should be included in the court’s scheduling
order.235 The 2015 amendments to the FRCP encourage judges to be more
hands-on in discovery planning in the scheduling conference.236 It is consistent
with those amendments for the scheduling conference and order to outline the
judge’s expectations and the judge’s plan to refer attorneys for discipline when
they violate professional conduct rules.
A judge will then have to decide how much guidance to provide attorneys
about expectations. Just like ineffective boilerplate objections, including a long,
boilerplate page of information in every scheduling order will likely be
counterproductive. Attorneys will be unlikely to read it or think about how it
applies to them. Similarly, a short reminder that RPC 3.4 applies and that
attorneys can be referred for discipline if they violate the rule is not enough; such
a statement does not alert attorneys to the specific types of discovery conduct
they should avoid.237
Instead, the judge should think about and address the specific issues that are
likely to arise in the case before the judge, as well as common forms of discovery
misconduct. With this framework in mind, judges may want to include discussion
of several (or all) of the following in their scheduling conferences and scheduling
orders:

233. See supra Part V.B (discussing the goals of consistently alerting attorneys to the prospect of discipline
for discovery misconduct).
234. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(1)(A)–(B) (directing the district court to issue a scheduling order after
receiving the parties’ 26(f) report or after consulting with counsel at a scheduling conference).
235. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3) (contents of scheduling order).
236. The 2015 amendments to the rule removed a reference to consulting with the parties “by telephone, mail
or other means,” clarifying that the scheduling conference should be interactive. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(1)(B)
advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (“A scheduling conference is more effective if the court and
parties engage in direct simultaneous communication.”).
237. See supra notes 162–79 and accompanying text (discussing discovery misconduct that should be
referred for discipline).
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• Preservation and Spoliation. Judges should discuss with the parties

the preservation efforts that have been made to date and additional
steps that should be taken, and resolve any disputes between the
parties concerning preservation efforts that should be made.238 These
issues should be memorialized in the scheduling order.239 On the issue
of discipline, judges should alert attorneys that if evidence is
destroyed because of an attorney’s non-compliance with preservation
efforts described in the scheduling order or required by other sources
of law, the court will determine whether the attorney has violated RPC
3.4(a),240 and if so, will refer the attorney for discipline.
• Proportionate Discovery. The parties and the judge may be able to
agree upon phased or limited discovery (such as initially confining
document discovery to a certain number of key players) that is
proportionate to the needs of the case.241 If such limits are included in
the scheduling order, the judge could also direct parties that seeking
discovery beyond these parameters without leave of the court may
violate the scope of discovery contained in FRCP 26(b)(1) and violate
RPC 3.4(c) or (d), which may result in a discipline referral.
• Transparency in Making Specific Objections and Explaining
Documents Withheld (or Not Searched for) on the Basis of Those
Objections. The judge should remind the parties that the FRCP
require objections to be stated with specificity242 and require the
responding party to state whether any documents are being withheld
(or not searched for) on the basis of an objection.243 The judge should
explain that the judge interprets these rules to mean that attorneys
should not use boilerplate or “cut and paste” objections, and that each
objection must specifically address the content of the request.
Concerning discipline, the judge should explain that if an attorney
violates the foregoing rules by (1) making general or boilerplate
objections; (2) making objections without stating whether documents
are being withheld or not searched for on that basis; or (3) withholding
responsive documents without objection or through a misleading

238. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C) (parties’ discovery plan should address preservation of ESI); FED. R. CIV.
P. 16(b)(1)(B) (discussing timing of scheduling conference in relation to entry of scheduling order).
239. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii) (scheduling order should address preservation of ESI).
240. MODEL RULES R. 3.4. The references in this Part to RPC sections correspond to provisions of the Model
Rules. Judges will need to adapt these references to the version of RPC 3.4 adopted by the court. See supra notes
102–06 and accompanying text.
241. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (addressing factors relevant to proportionate discovery).
242. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B).
243. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(C) (“An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being
withheld on the basis of that objection.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(C) advisory committee’s note to 2015
amendment (“An objection that states the limits that have controlled the search for responsive and relevant
materials qualifies as a statement that the materials have been ‘withheld.’”).
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objection, the court will determine whether the attorney violated RPC
3.4(a), (c), or (d) and if so, refer the attorney for discipline.244
• Violating Court Orders. The court should note that generally a rule
of civil procedure has been violated when an attorney is sanctioned for
violating a court order, including this scheduling order and orders
compelling production of documents. Accordingly, in any situation
when the court sanctions an attorney for violating a court order, the
court will also consider whether the attorney has violated RPC 3.4(c)
(or any other provision of RPC 3.4), and if so, refer the attorney for
discipline.245
2. ADDRESSING DISCOVERY MISCONDUCT WHEN IT OCCURS

The next challenge for a judge is to address discovery misconduct when it
occurs. A judge should start by considering whether discipline can be imposed in
the pending case, rather than referring the case to the court’s formal disciplinary
process. First, a judge should consider the court’s local rules concerning the
discipline system and determine whether those rules permit the judge to handle
discipline within the pending case246 or prohibit or otherwise place any limits on
a judge’s ability to impose discipline pursuant to inherent authority.247 Assuming
the judge can handle discipline within the pending case, the judge next should
consider whether he or she should do so. A key consideration should be whether
the procedures provided by the court’s internal disciplinary system (such as
investigation by an attorney or committee) are safeguards needed given the
factual and legal complexity of the case.248 For example, when the misconduct is
fully known to the judge—such as improper objections that violate the
FRCP—the added layer of an investigation may not fit the needs of the case.249
Prior to imposing discipline, the judge must give the attorney due process
protections of notice of possible discipline and an opportunity to defend against

244. See MODEL RULES R. 3.4.
245. See MODEL RULES R. 3.4.
246. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
248. See Ryan v. Siupa, 772 F.3d 50, 58–59 (1st Cir. 2014) (determining that a court has inherent authority to
discipline absent an unambiguous local rule taking away that power, but also noting it is “unlikely that the
district court would create such a detailed and resource-intensive [internal disciplinary system] if individual
district court judges could decline to follow it”).
249. When a judge observes the misconduct that is the basis of discipline, there is a lesser need for
procedural protections. See, e.g., In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968) (“[W]hen proceedings for disbarment
are not taken for matters occurring in open court, in the presence of the judges, notice should be given to the
attorney of the charges made and opportunity afforded him for explanation and [defense].”); Steward v.
Steward, 529 B.R. 903, 919 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (“The bankruptcy court did not need to refer the matter to
appointed counsel for ‘investigation and prosecution of a formal disciplinary proceeding’ [provided by local
rule] because the misconduct at issue was directed at and witnessed by the bankruptcy court.”).
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that discipline.250 Following a hearing on discipline, a court must apply the same
standards for imposing discipline that would be imposed in a separate disciplinary proceeding.251
If handling discipline in the pending case is not an appropriate or feasible
option, the judge should refer the attorney to the court’s discipline system.252
B. COURT-LEVEL REFORMS: JUDICIAL EDUCATION, ATTORNEY
EDUCATION, AND AMENDMENTS TO LOCAL RULES

A federal court’s judges could take a system-wide approach to the issues of
discovery misconduct and discipline. Judicial education programs, lawyer
education programs, and local rule amendments are some avenues that a federal
court may want to explore.
1. EDUCATION PROGRAMS FOR JUDGES

A continuing legal education program for judges, law clerks, and staff is an
ideal time to consider the topic of discipline for discovery misconduct. The
program should include the basics regarding applicable professional conduct
rules,253 reporting rules applicable to judges,254 and the court’s discipline
system.255 The discussion should consider the possible benefits of more
consistent, appropriate discipline referrals.256 Judges could be provided with
examples from recent cases of attorneys who could have been referred for
discipline and the likely outcome if that referral had been made.
Likely the most important part of this program is a discussion of the judges’
own experiences. Judges and law clerks should be encouraged to discuss whether
the 2015 amendments to the FRCP are making a difference in discovery practice
in the court, examples of discovery misconduct they have observed, and the
reasons they do (or, more likely, do not) refer attorneys for discipline. It would
be useful for a presenter to compile the court’s statistics over the previous twelve
months: motions to compel filed (and granted), motions for sanctions filed (and
granted), discipline referrals for discovery misconduct, and attorneys disciplined
for discovery conduct. This discussion may reveal the extent of the discovery
problem, misconceptions about discipline, as well as legitimate concerns that the
court could address to facilitate discipline referrals.

250. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 218–22 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting courts with and without internal discipline systems).
253. See supra notes 102–06 and accompanying text (regarding federal courts’ adoption of professional
conduct rules and regarding state versions of RPC 3.4).
254. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES, Canon 3(B)(5).
255. See supra notes 117–18 (regarding federal courts’ discipline systems).
256. See supra Part V.
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2. REMEDIAL DISCOVERY EDUCATION PROGRAMS TO ADDRESS LAWYER MISCONDUCT

Courts should also develop remedial discovery education programs for
attorneys who violate discovery rules. Attorneys could be referred to such a
program as part of a diversion program or as a form of discipline. Courts should
consider the educational advantages of providing attorneys with hands-on
opportunities to correct the types of mistakes that landed them in the diversion
program. For example, attorneys referred to the program for violating rules
governing discovery objections could be required to participate in a class on
proper objections and then revise their own objections and responses.257 Local
rules, discussed next, could facilitate judges directing attorneys to this program.
3. AMENDMENTS TO LOCAL RULES THAT FACILITATE DISCOVERY DISCIPLINE AND
EDUCATION

A court-wide discussion may reveal procedural barriers to judges fully
utilizing the discipline system to address discovery misconduct. Such issues
could be addressed through new or amended local rules.258 Most U.S. district
courts already have local rules adopting professional conduct rules and attorney
discipline systems, but for courts that do not, adopting local rules to create such a
system should be considered.259 Other possible local rules are addressed below.
Judges may choose not to refer attorneys for discipline if they perceive that
making the referral will be time consuming.260 A local rule could simplify (or
clarify) the process for making a discipline referral to the court’s internal
disciplinary system. The rule could provide: “A referral for discipline may be
stated within any court order in which the court determines an attorney has
engaged in conduct that may violate a professional conduct rule.”
A court could also adopt a local rule addressing when a judge should handle
discipline as part of a pending case rather than referring the case to the court’s
disciplinary system.261 In crafting such a rule, the court should consider the
procedures included in its internal discipline system and decide when using those
procedures is more cumbersome than necessary to protect the rights of the
attorney and further the goals of imposing discipline. As a result of this process, a

257. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text (explaining rules governing proper objections and the
need to describe documents withheld from discovery).
258. Federal courts have the authority under the Rules Enabling Act to adopt local rules governing court
business. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2012). Local rules may be adopted after a public notice and comment period
and need not be submitted to Congress (as required for the FRCP). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(b), 2074; FED. R. CIV.
P. 83(a) (describing district court process for adopting local rules).
259. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text.
261. Arguably, the court has inherent authority to discipline within the pending case absent local court rules
explicitly taking away that authority. See supra note 205. The point of a local rule would be to remind judges
that they can exercise that authority and to guide them in determining when it is appropriate to do so.
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court may adopt a local rule providing the judge should impose discipline in the
pending case when: (1) there is a lack of factual complexity (such as when the
judge observed the misconduct or is otherwise fully aware of the facts relevant to
a finding of misconduct),262 and (2) when the attorney has no prior discipline
record and the misconduct is properly punishable by discipline less than
suspension.263 Finally, the rule should also explain the procedural protections that
the attorney should be provided when discipline is handled in a pending case,
such as issuing a show cause order that gives notice of the reasons discipline is
being considered and the specific discipline contemplated, and provide a defined
period of time for the attorney to respond in writing prior to a hearing on the
matter.264
There are two ways local rules could make lawyer education programs a part
of the court’s discipline system. A court could adopt a local rule that permits an
attorney to enter a diversion program for minor offenses.265 Participation in an
education program should be explicitly referenced as a means of satisfying a
diversion agreement.266 Another option would be to list participation in an
education program as a possible form of discipline.267 Even without such a local
rule, a court could order education as discipline pursuant to a catchall provision
allowing a judge to fashion appropriate discipline268 or pursuant to inherent
authority.269 Nonetheless, having an explicit reference to education in a local rule

262. This element addresses the concern that an investigation may not be necessary when the judge is fully
aware of the misconduct. See supra notes 248–49 and accompanying text.
263. This element is meant to lessen concerns of addressing more complex discipline decisions involving
prior offenses as an aggravating factor or more severe forms of discipline. See ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING
LAWYER SANCTIONS, at Standard 9.3.
264. See generally supra note 206 (discussing procedural due process requirements in discipline
proceedings).
265. Diversion rules seem to be somewhat rare in federal court local rules. See, e.g., supra note 123. Rules
addressing diversion are common in state professional conduct rules. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3 (“If, as a result
of investigation, the chair concludes that minor unethical conduct has occurred, the chair may request that the
Director, or his designee, divert the matter and approve an agreement in lieu of discipline.”).
266. For example, the New Jersey diversion rule referenced in the previous note specifically lists
“satisfactory completion of a course of study” as a possible requirement for satisfaction of diversion. N.J. CT. R.
1:20-3.
267. See, e.g., W.D. WASH. LOC. R. 83.3(c)(4)(F) (“Any discipline imposed may be subject to specific
conditions, which may include, but are not limited to, continuing legal education requirements, counseling
and/or supervision of practice.”).
268. See, e.g., E.D. TENN. LOC. R. 83.7(a) (“Discipline which may be imposed includes disbarment,
suspension, reprimand, or such other further disciplinary action as the Court may deem appropriate and just.”)
(emphasis added); MASS. DIST. LOC. R. 83.6.4 (“An attorney may be subject to the following types of discipline
after a finding of misconduct pursuant to these rules . . . such other disciplinary action as may be reasonable
under the circumstances.”) (emphasis added); D. NEB. LOC. R. 1.8(g)(2) (“An attorney subject to the court’s
disciplinary jurisdiction may be disbarred, suspended from practice before the court, reprimanded, or subjected
to other appropriate disciplinary action.”) (emphasis added).
269. See generally In re Marshall, No. 3:15-MC-88-JWD, 2016 WL 81484, at *1 (M.D. La. Jan. 6, 2016)
(suspending attorney and ordering completion of six hours of ethics continuing legal education).
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would provide a reminder of the availability of the option, thus encouraging its
use.
C. FEDERAL JUDICIARY-WIDE REFORM: ADOPTION OF A MANDATORY
DISCIPLINE REFERRAL RULE IN THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES

Strengthening rules requiring discovery misconduct reporting to disciplinary
authorities is another approach that might be taken to address discovery
discipline. However, for reasons discussed below, this is likely the least effective
avenue to meaningful change in discovery conduct.
Rules requiring defined discovery misconduct to be referred to disciplinary
authorities would likely result in more discipline (or diversion), and ultimately,
might deter the most serious forms of discovery misconduct. Through local rules,
individual courts could strengthen the professional conduct rules requiring
attorneys to report discovery misconduct by other attorneys.270 However, judges
are equally well positioned to know about counsel’s discovery misconduct, and
judges face fewer adverse consequences than attorneys if they report the
misconduct.271 For this reason, a better approach would appear to be strengthening the judicial reporting rule.
As discussed in Part IV, the current Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges requires
federal judges to take “appropriate action” to address attorney misconduct but
does not mandate reporting to disciplinary authorities.272 A viable approach
would be to mandate judges to refer attorneys to disciplinary authorities for
defined forms of discovery misconduct. Currently, California mandates judicial
reports of attorney misconduct to the state bar when certain trigger events
occur.273 Ironically, even though California requires bar notification of sanctions
against an attorney, the provision specifically excludes sanctions against an
attorney for “failure to make discovery.”274
The difficult part, then, is deciding what conduct should trigger mandatory
reporting under an amended rule. One approach would be to mandate a

270. See supra note 258 and accompanying text (describing authority to adopt local rules).
271. See Greenbaum, supra note 136, at 544 (asserting that there are more reasons for lawyers than there are
for judges to avoid reporting attorney misconduct).
272. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES, Canon 3(B)(5).
273. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6086.7 (the statute provides that a court shall notify the California state
bar of: (1) contempt against an attorney (that may involve grounds warranting discipline); (2) a modification or
reversal of a judgment based in whole or part upon misconduct, incompetence, or willful misrepresentation by
an attorney; (3) sanctions against an attorney (except “for failure to make discovery” or for less than $1,000); (4)
a civil penalty under a certain provision of California’s Family Code; and (5) a defined violation of California’s
penal code by a prosecuting attorney under circumstances involving bad faith and impacting the rights of an
accused); see also Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Automatic Reporting of Lawyer Misconduct to Disciplinary
Authorities: Filling the Reporting Gap, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 467–71 (2009) (explaining California’s statute as
including the most extensive set of systemic obligations to report occurrences of particular acts to disciplinary
authorities).
274. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6086.7(a)(3).
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disciplinary referral if the court finds that an attorney violated court rules
governing discovery. The advantage of this approach is simplicity. But the
disadvantage is that it would result in both over-reporting of misconduct (such as
where the attorney did not “knowingly” violate court rules, and thus would not be
in violation of RPC 3.4) and the underreporting of misconduct (such as where the
attorney engaged in intentional spoliation of evidence, which is not a violation of
a court rule).
Another approach would be to mandate a disciplinary referral when a court
sanctions an attorney (and not just a client) under the authority of FRCP 26(c),
26(g) or 37, or the court’s inherent authority. The advantage of this approach is
that it is simple to implement and (arguably) captures the most serious forms of
attorney misconduct. However, there are some significant problems with this
approach. One is that pervasive forms of attorney misconduct may regularly fall
outside of the mandate, such as an attorney’s negligence in advising clients about
preservation or an attorney’s use of boilerplate objections. Another disadvantage
is that it might cause courts to err on the side of not sanctioning attorneys,
recognizing the sanctions would subject the attorney to discipline.275 Finally,
given the fact that courts already sanction clients more often than attorneys,276 a
good deal of attorney misconduct would continue to fall outside of mandatory
reporting.
There is not an obvious answer to how a mandatory reporting rule should be
formulated. Perhaps this is why ultimately, this approach is not as workable as
reforms by individual judges and courts. Nonetheless, if a mandatory reporting
rule were adopted, federal judges and the Judicial Conference would need to
commit to continuously studying the rule’s effectiveness and making further
amendments as needed to address its shortcomings.

CONCLUSION
Federal courts have largely ignored the disciplinary system as a tool to address
and deter document discovery misconduct. If attorney discipline were used
appropriately and consistently, federal courts could see an improvement in
discovery practice. Appropriate discipline does not stifle zealous advocacy; it
facilitates it. An attorney would not face discipline for being on the losing side of
a discovery dispute. Rather, discipline is generally only appropriate when an
attorney misleads an opponent in discovery or intentionally or negligently fails to
perform a duty owed to an opposing party. Consistently educating attorneys
about expectations in this regard and consistently using the discipline system
when attorneys engage in misconduct could change behavior. Unlike the often

275. This is a significant concern given the authority to sanction the client and not the attorney. See, e.g., FED.
R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3), 37(a)(5)(A), 37(b)(2)(C)); supra Part IV.
276. See Willoughby et al., supra note 3, at 815–18.
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shared burden of sanctions, attorneys alone will feel the professional consequences of discipline. This should provide an incentive for attorneys to lead (and
not follow) their clients through discovery. And imposing discipline for discovery
misconduct would remind attorneys that fair play in discovery is an important
value of the legal profession.
Ultimately, the most effective avenues to reform likely lie with the judges and
courts that deal with discovery misconduct on a day-to-day basis. Individual
judges can choose to take a more active role in educating lawyers about the
consequences of misconduct and then impose disciplinary consequences when
lawyers break the rules. Further, U.S. district courts may successfully encourage
court-wide use of the discipline system through conversations among the court’s
judges and adoption of local rules that make the discipline system more efficient
and effective. While it is impossible to know if such reforms would make a
significant impact, it is certain that document discovery will remain dysfunctional if courts continue on the current course.
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